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Article 10 of the European Community Treaty has gradually given rise to a large body of case
law on a wide variety of subjects, including several profoundly important constitutional princi-
ples of Community law: the duty of national courts to give effective protection to rights given by
Community law, the duty to give direct effect to directives against the State, the duty to interpret
national law so as to be compatible with Community law, and the right to judicial review. These
principles are the foundation of the constitutional structure that the Court of Justice has built, in
which national courts ensure the rule of Community law in most of the circumstances in which it
applies. This Article describes the development of the case law of the Court of Justice, divided
for convenience, somewhat arbitrarily, into three periods. The periods are 1952 to 1990, 1990 to
2000, and 2000 to date. As will be seen, much of the elaboration of the case law occurred between
1990 and 2000, although several basic principles had been established before that. Before tracing
this development, one feature of the Community legal system needs to be explained, since it is
fundamental, and very different from other legal systems such as the U.S. legal system. The rules
of European Community (“EC”) law, and now of European Union (“EU”) law, are primarily ap-
plied and enforced by national courts and authorities, and not by the Community institutions. The
national law and Community law spheres are not separate bodies of law applied by separate insti-
tutions. There is no line of demarcation between the two. This fact makes Article 10 much more
important than it would otherwise be. It also explains why the case law on Article 10 developed
gradually, and is still developing.
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Dr. John Temple Lang*
INTRODUCTION
Article 10 (formerly Article 5 but for convenience here re-
ferred to as Article 10) of the European Community Treaty ("EC
Treaty") reads:
Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether
general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations
arising out of this Treaty or resulting from action taken by the
institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate the
achievement of the Community's tasks.
They shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardize
the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty.1
This apparently vague Article has gradually given rise to a
large body of case law on a wide variety of subjects, including
several profoundly important constitutional principles of Com-
munity law: the duty of national courts to give effective protec-
tion to rights given by Community law, the duty to give direct
effect to directives against the State, the duty to interpret na-
tional law so as to be compatible with Community law, and the
right to judicial review. These principles are the foundation of
the constitutional structure that the Court of Justice has built, in
which national courts ensure the rule of Community law in most
of the circumstances in which it applies.
This Article describes the development of the case law of
the Court of Justice, divided for convenience, somewhat arbitrar-
ily, into three periods. The periods are 1952 to 1990,2 1990 to
2000, and 2000 to date. As will be seen, much of the elaboration
* Cleary Gottlieb Steen and Hamilton, Brussels and London; Professor, Trinity
College, Dublin; Visiting Senior Research Fellow, Oxford.
1. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community art.
10, Dec. 24, 2002, OJ. C 325/33, at 42 (2002) [hereinafter EC Treaty].
2. Article 86 of the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty corresponds to
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of the case law occurred between 1990 and 2000, although sev-
eral basic principles had been established before that.
Before tracing this development, one feature of the Com-
munity legal system needs to be explained, since it is fundamen-
tal, and very different from other legal systems such as the U.S.
legal system. The rules of European Community ("EC") law,
and now of European Union ("EU") law, are primarily applied
and enforced by national courts and authorities, and not by the
Community institutions. The national law and Community law
spheres are not separate bodies of law applied by separate insti-
tutions. There is no line of demarcation between the two. This
fact makes Article 10 much more important than it would other-
wise be. It also explains why the case law on Article 10 devel-
oped gradually, and is still developing.
I. THE FIRST PERIOD: THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOME
BASIC PRINCIPLES
At first, Article 5, as it then was, was considered to have little
significance. It was too vague, and had no obvious content of its
own. It sounded like a similarly worded provision of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. Even those lawyers who no-
ticed the similarity to the clause in the German Basic Law oblig-
ing the Ldinder to cooperate with the German federal institu-
tions did not see that Article 10 might become significant in the
European Community.
In the first cases in which the Court of Justice expressly re-
lied on the Article, it was mentioned almost incidentally, as con-
firmation of arguments and conclusions that might have been,
and in some cases obviously were, based on first principles or on
analysis of other parts of the Treaty. This was true both in the
case of the positive duties under Article 10, to adopt specific
measures, and the negative duties, to avoid interfering with
Community law.
In the first significant case, the Italian Fruit Trees case,' the
Court had to consider whether Italian legislation, in terms sub-
stantially identical to those of a Community Regulation, was per-
Article 10. See Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18,
1951, art. 86, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 (1952).
3. Leonesio v. Ministero Dell'agricoltura e Foresete (Fruit Trees), Case 93/71,
[1972] E.C.R. 287, 17-24.
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missible under the Treaty. The Court held that it was not, be-
cause its presence on the statute book questioned the applica-
tion of the Regulation in Italy, and because lawyers referring to it
would be misled and would fail to realize that the Regulation was
in force. Only the interpretation of the Regulation, and not of
the Italian legislation, could be the subject of a reference to the
Court of Justice under what is now Article 234.' In the second
Fruit Trees case, it was held that Italy had a legal duty under Arti-
cle 10 formally to repeal the legislation, and could not merely
rely on the fact that it was contrary to Community law and so, in
effect, impliedly repealed.' This case was one of the first cases
brought by the Commission in which Article 10 was the principal
legal basis for the Commission's arguments.
But even the Commission, which was then creative in its ar-
guments on some Community law issues, did not at first see the
full potential of Article 10. As a result, Article 10 was relied on
initially in national courts, and the Commission based argu-
ments on it only opportunistically, when and if the national
courts referred a question to the Court of Justice.
As in many other respects, Judge Pierre Pescatore was far-
sighted enough to see the significance of Article 10.6 He dis-
cussed it with me in the 1970s, and gave me a copy of a short
note which he had already compiled on all of the case law of the
Court, up to that time, on Article 10.
A. The Fisheries Cases
One of the first important occasions on which the Commis-
sion made deliberate use of Article 10 was a fisheries case. 7
Under Annex VI to a series of Council Resolutions adopted in
4. The Court accepted questions of national law, when it is the same as EC law,
only much later. See, e.g., Leur-Bloem v. Amsterdam, Case C-28/95, (1997] E.C.R. I-
4161, 32.
5. See Commission v. Italy, Case 30/72, [1973] E.C.R. 161, 11; see also Variola v.
Amministrazione Italiana delle Finanze, Case 34/73, [1973] E.C.R. 981, 10.
6. P. Pescatore, Les objectifs de la Communaute Europienne comme principes d'interprtta-
tion dans la jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice, in MISCELLANEA GANSHOF VAN DER MEERSCH
Vol. 2, 350 (1972); Pierre Pescatore, La carence du legislateur communautaire et le devoir du
juge, in RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG, EUROPARECHT UND STAATENINTEGRATION: GEDACHTNISS-
CHRIFT FOR LgONTIN-JEAN CONsTANTINESCO 559, 578 (1983); Vlad Constantinesco,
L'artice 5 CEE, de la bonnefoi d la loyauti communautaire, in Du DROIT INTERNATIONAL AU
DROIT DE L'INTtGRATION 97 (F. Capotorti, C.-D. Ehleman, J. Frowein, F. Jacobs, R. Joliet,
T. Koopmans & R. Kovar eds., 1987).
7. See France v. United Kingdom, Case 141/78, [1979] E.C.R. 2941, 7 1-13.
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The Hague, it was declared that Member States could adopt na-
tional measures for conservation of fisheries, after seeking the
approval of the Commission, until a certain date. The United
Kingdom, after very perfunctory consultation which amounted
to little more than informing the Commission what was pro-
posed, adopted measures on minimum mesh size which had the
effect of obliging French fishing boats fishing in U.K. waters ei-
ther to stop fishing or to buy new nets. France, unusually,
brought proceedings against the U.K. under what is now Article
227 EC. The United Kingdom argued that a Council Resolution
has no binding legal effect, which in general is correct. The
Commission argued, however, that Article 10 had the effect of
making this Resolution legally binding, since it was intended to
regulate, at least provisionally, an important and difficult subject
matter of clear common interest, which was the subject of active
negotiations in the Council. The Court accepted the argument,
and declared the Resolution to be legally binding.
That ruling paved the way for two other cases, brought by
the Commission itself against the United Kingdom, and again
concerning fisheries measures. Again the United Kingdom's
consultation with the Commission had been purely nominal,
and the Commission argued that seeking the approval of the
Commission meant that its consent to the measures, which had
not been given, was legally required.8 The Commission also
used Article 10 in a new way (although one clearly envisaged by
the words of Article 10, which imposes positive obligations to act
as well as negative duties not to obstruct). It argued that because
conservation of fish stocks had been clearly accepted as a Com-
munity objective, the U.K. had a legal obligation under Article
10 to adopt measures prohibiting fishing of a herring stock when
the clear scientific advice was that it should be stopped. The
Court agreed with both arguments. 9
In the third Fisheries case the Commission again used Article
10, and went even further.' ° As already mentioned, the Hague
8. See Commission v. United Kingdom, Case 32/79, [1980] E.C.R. 2403, 25-29.
9. See id.; Opinion of Advocate General Reischl, Commission v. United Kingdom,
Case 32/79, [1980] E.C.R. 2460, 2460-61; see also Thieffry v. Conseil de L'ordre des
Avocats a la cour de Paris, Case 71/76, [1977] E.C.R. 765, 13-23; Ireland v. Commis-
sion, Case 325/85, [1987] E.C.R. 5041, 15; Pluimveeslachterij, Joined Cases 47 & 48/
83, [1984] E.C.R. 171, 22-23.
10. See Commission v. United Kingdom, Case 804/79, [1981] E.C.R. 1045; see also
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Resolution had said that Member States could adopt national
fisheries conservation measures, having sought the approval of
the Commission, up to a certain date. The Commission argued
that as the Resolution was legally binding, it was to be inter-
preted as prohibiting national measures, even with the consent
of the Commission, after the date in question. Once again, the
Court upheld the argument, and the foundation of the Commu-
nity fisheries policy had been laid. From the relevant date, the
Community's competence over the biological resources of the
sea had become exclusive, and the Commission had its normal
role of proposing Community measures (although some powers
were later delegated back to the Member States).
In another Fisheries case, the Advocate General said that
when the Council has power to adopt conservation measures but
has not yet done so:
[M]ember-States have an obligation, on the basis of Article 5
of the EEC Treaty, to adopt the necessary conservation mea-
sures in the general interest, while observing the substantive and
procedural requirements of Community law. The interim de-
cisions adopted by the Council . . . [are] to be regarded
merely as a specific definition of Member-States' obligations
under Article 5 of the EEC Treaty. [I]f the Council does not
act, the Commission has power to grant such consent, irre-
spective of whether the decisions concerned are regarded as a
restoration of powers to the Member-States or, more cor-
rectly, as a specific definition of the obligations arising from
Article 5 of the ECC Treaty. 1
The Italian Fruit Trees case has not led to subsequent judg-
ments based on the same principles, primarily because the cir-
cumstances that gave rise to them were too unusual. However,
the fisheries cases have proved to be seminal in several respects.
B. Emerging Lines of Cases
During the 1980s the case law on Article 10 began to de-
velop a characteristic feature which is now very pronounced, and
which has had certain consequences for the general understand-
Commission v. Belgium, Case C-377/03, slip op., 93 (ECJ Oct. 5, 2006) (not yet re-
ported) (stating that a Member State has a duty not to adopt legislation to which the
Commission has objected).
11. Opinion of Advocate General Reischl, Van Justitie v. Van Dam (no. 2), Case
124/80, [1981] E.C.R. 1447, J 93, 99 (emphasis in original).
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ing by lawyers of Article 10. This feature is that the Court makes
a statement, based on Article 10, of a principle that is applicable
in circumstances that occur repeatedly, for example, the princi-
ple that Member States have a duty under Article 10 to give in-
formation to the Commission to enable the Commission to de-
cide whether an infringement of Community law has occurred.
Once stated, this principle, and some others mentioned below,
are obviously correct, and they can be referred to and acted
upon without discussion or elaboration in later cases. After the
first judgments, the specific principle stated by the Court is re-
peated, usually using the same words, in later judgments. This is
of course very common in the case law of the Community
Courts. However, it is a feature of the case law on Article 10 that,
because the principles are regarded as clear and so do not need
discussion in later judgments, the principle is repeated later,
without the Court mentioning that the principle is based on Arti-
cle 10. The effect is to give readers of the later judgments the
impression that the principle was in effect invented by the Court,
and has no identifiable legal basis. If the principle in question is
uncontroversial, this causes no difficulties. However, it gives an
incorrect impression of 'Judicial legislation." It also has the un-
fortunate consequence that the importance of Article 10 is un-
derestimated, because the fact that it is the legal basis for the
principle or rule in question is unknown or forgotten. The most
striking result of this failure to refer to Article 10 is the Moorman
judgment.12 This feature is compounded by the fact that when
Article 10 is mentioned in judgments, it is almost always men-
tioned briefly, without discussion. This also causes its impor-
tance to be underestimated.
C. The Direct Effect of Directives
Directives according to the EC Treaty are binding as to the
results to be achieved, but leave to Member States the choice of
form and means. They are legislation, in other words, that is
intended to be implemented by national measures, whether leg-
islative or otherwise. So there is a general obligation to make all
the changes needed in national law to give a directive "full ef-
fect." 13
12. Oberkreisdirektor v. Moorman, Case 190/87, [1988] E.C.R. 4689.
13. See Commission v. Greece, Case 68/88, [1989] E.C.R_ 2965, 22-23 (the en-
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The question arose, however, whether a directive that had
not been implemented could have any legal effects, and specifi-
cally whether a Member State that had not implemented a direc-
tive could take action against a private party which it could not
have taken if it had given effect to the directive. In other words,
could a State that had not implemented a directive take advan-
tage of its own failure, in proceedings against a private party?
As is well known, the Court ofJustice decided that Commu-
nity law prevents a State from doing this.1 4 The Court gave sev-
eral reasons. A State may not take advantage of its own failure to
implement a directive, in order to enforce legislation that the
directive obliges it to repeal. Also, Article 10 obliges Member
States to give full effect to Community law rules, including those
that are not otherwise directly applicable. This was controver-
sial. But the Court repeated its finding in a number of later
cases, without referring to Article 10. It was not until fourteen
years later, in Moorman, that the Court, in reply to a direct and
rather pointed question from a national court, confirmed that
Article 10 was the legal basis for this rule.
D. The Duty to Give Full Effect to Community Law
By the end of the 1980s there was a substantial body of case
law, all based more or less clearly on Article 10, stating the broad
principle that national authorities have a legal duty to give full
effect to Community law. That principle had been applied in a
variety of circumstances. It had been held to impose positive du-
forcement procedures and the diligence with which they are applied must be the same
as for breaches of national law); Commission v. Belgium, Case 239/85, [1986] E.C.R.
3645, 7 (Article 5 imposes a duty to implement a directive by a legally binding mea-
sure); Deutsche Milchkontor GmbH v. Federal Republic of Germany, Joined Cases 205-
215/82, [1983] E.C.R. 2633, 1 17-23; Opinion of Advocate General Verloren Van
Tehmaat, Deutsche Milchkontor GmbH v. Federal Republic of Germany, Joined Cases
205-215/82, [1983] E.C.R. 2633, 2680, 2683; Opinion of Advocate General Verloren
Van Themaat, Fromme v. BALM, Case 54/81, [1982] E.C.R. 1466, 1469, 1477-78; Com-
mission v. Belgium, Case 137/80, [1981] E.C.R. 2393, 9; Opinion of Advocate General
Capotorti, Commission v. Belgium, Case 137/80, [1981] E.C.R. 2393, 2413-14, 2416;
Scheer v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und Futtermittel, Case 30/70, [1970]
E.C.R. 1197, 10; Commission v. Belgium, Case 85/85, [1986] E.C.R1 1149, 22-23
(duty to implement Protocol on Privileges).
14. See Salumificio v. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato, Case 130/78,
[1979] E.C.R. 867, 27; Haselhorst v. Finanzamt Dusseldorf, Case 23/70, [1970] E.C.R.
881, 5; see also Becker v. Finanzamt Munster-Innenstadt, Case 8/81, [1982] E.C.R. 53;
Criminal Proceedings against Tullio Ratti, Case 48/78, [1979] E.C.R. 1629; Van Duyn v.
Home Office, Case 41/74, [1974] E.C.R. 1337.
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ties on national courts and other national authorities. This is
the most important single principle resulting from Article 10,
and it is useful to explain that even in the 1980s it had given rise
to a series of consequences, many of which have since led to dis-
tinct lines of cases.
During the 1980s, there was already a substantial body of
case law requiring national authorities to take whatever mea-
sures were needed to allow Community regulations, in particular
on the common agricultural policy, to operate as intended.
Member States could not rely on their own legislation as a rea-
son for non-fulfilment of their obligations under Community
law. They must ensure that the judgments of the Court of Jus-
tice are complied with. The first of what later became a long
series of cases on the implications of directives for national
courts were also decided during this period.
15
The duty to give full effect to Community law meant, among
other things, that national courts had to protect the rights of
private parties against the State. They were also obliged to en-
sure that Community law was enforced against private parties
when necessary. This included a duty to recover money paid to
private parties contrary to Community law, whether the money
was paid out of Community funds or was unlawful State aid.16
It was in the cases declaring the duty of national courts to
protect the rights of private parties against the State, and in par-
ticular their rights to recover tax which should not have been
imposed on them, that the Court of Justice stated a formula that
has grown in importance. 7 The Court said that national law
15. See generally XVIII FIDE CONGRESS, COMMUNITY DIRECTIVES: EFFECTS, EFFECTIVE-
NESS, JUSTICIABILITY Volume II (Stockholm, 1998).
16. See, e.g., Commission v. France, C-232/05, [2006] E.C.R. 1-10071, 61; Com-
mission v. Germany, Case 94/87, [1989] E.C.R. 175, 12; Deutsche Milchkontor GmbH
v. Germany, Joined Cases 205-215/82, [1983] E.C.R. 2633, 25; Fromme v. Bundesan-
stalt fur landwirtschaffliche Marktordnung, Case 54/81, [1982] E.C.R. 1449, 1 10;
BayWa AG v. Bundesanstalt ffir landwirtschaftliche Marktordnung, Joined Cases 146,
192 & 193/81, [1982] E.C.R. 1503, 31; Amministrazione delle Finanze v. Sr Meri-
dionale Industria Salumi, Fratelli Vasanelli & Fratelli Ultrocchi, Joined Cases 66, 127 &
128/79, [1980] E.C.R. 1237, 1 21; see also Von Colson v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen,
Case 14/83, [1984] E.C.R. 1891, 28; Comet BV v. Producktschap voor Siergewassen,
Case 45/76, [1976] E.C.R. 2043, 15; Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG et Rewe-Zentral AG v.
Landwirtschaftskammer fur das Saarland, Case 33/76, [1976] E.C.R. 1989, 6.
17. See Commission v. Italy, Case 104/86, [1988] E.C.R. 1799, 7 12-13; Amminis-
trazione delle finanze dello stato v. San Georgio, Case 199/82, [1983] E.C.R. 3595, 1
20; Lippische Hauptgenossenschaft eG et West falische CentraI-Genorsenschaft eG v.
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must not make it impossible or excessively difficult for private
parties to claim their rights, and that the relevant rules of na-
tional law must not be less favourable to those claiming their
rights under Community law than the rules applying to similar
claims under national law.18  These are the "effectiveness" and
the "equivalence" principles.
E. The Duty Not to Interfere With the Operation of Community Law
or Policy, or the Working of a Community Institution, or to
Encourage Breach of Community Law
During the 1980's another substantial body of case law had
developed, based on the "negative" duty of national authorities
not to interfere with the operation of Community law in the way
that it is intended to work. In Lord Bruce of Donington the Court
said that national tax authorities must not interfere with the ac-
tivities of Members of the European Parliament.19
More generally, in a line of cases concerned with common
agricultural policy regulations, the Court held that national mea-
sures must not interfere with the operation, in practice, of Com-
20munity measures.
Bundesanstalt fur landwirtschaftliche Marktordnung, Joined Cases 119 & 126/79,
[1980] E.C.R. 1863, 5; Amministrazione delle finanze dello stato v. Denkavit Italiana
Sri., Case 61/79, [1980] E.C.R. 1205, 1 25; Amministrazione delle finanze dello stato v.
Ariete SpA, Case 811/79, [1980] E.C.R. 2545, 17; Amministrazione delle finanze
dello stato v. Sas Mediterranea importazione, rappresentanze, esportanzione, com-
mercio (MIRECO), Case 826/79, [1980] E.C.R. 2559, 9 16; Ferwerda BV v. Produkt-
schap voor Vee en Vlees, Case 265/78, [1980] E.C.R. 617, 1 10; Hans Just I/S v. Danish
Ministry for Fiscal Affairs, Case 68/79, [1980] E.C.R. 501, 1 25; Pigs & Bacon Comm'n
v. McCarren and Co., Case 177/78, [1979] E.C.R. 2161, 1 26; lannelli & Volpi SpA v.
Meroni, Case 74/76, [1977] E.C.R. 557, 1 22; Rewe, [1976] E.C.R. 1989, 1 5; Comet,
[1976] E.C.R. 2043, 1 13; Russo v. Azienda di Stato per gli interventi sul mercato
agricolo (AIMA), Case 60/75, [1976] E.C.R. 45, 1 9; Humblet v. Belgium, Case 6/60,
[1960] E.C.R. 559, 572.
18. See Van de Haar & Kaveka de Meern BV, Joined Cases 177 & 178/82, [1984]
E.C.R. 1797, 1 12; Procureur GCn~ral v. Buys, Case 5/79, [1979] E.C.R. 3203, 1 30; SA
G.B.-INNO-BM v. Association des detaillants en tabac (ATAB), Case 13/77, [1977]
E.C.R. 2115, 11 30, 33.
19. Lord Bruce of Donington v. Aspden, Case 208/80, [1981] E.C.R. 2205, 9 14.
20. See, e.g., Commission v. Greece, Case C-281/87, [1989] E.C.R. 4015, 11 16-18;
Commission v. Belgium, Case 85/85, [1986] E.C.R. 1149, 11 22-23; Irish Creamery Milk
Suppliers Ass'n v. Ireland, Martin Doyle v. An Taoiseach, Joined Cases 36 & 71/80,
[1981] E.C.R. 735, 11 15, 20; Prosecutor du Roi v. Kefer, Joined Cases 95 & 96/79,
[1980] E.C.R. 103, 1 8; Buys, [1979] E.C.R. 3203, 1 18-30; McCarren, [1979] ECR 2161,
125; Grosoli, Case 223/78, [1979] E.C.R. 2621, 1 13; Danis, Joined Cases 16-20/79,
[1979] E.C.R. 3327, 1 10; Procureur du Roi v. Dechmann, Case 154/77, [1978] E.C.R.
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The first of a long line of cases saying that national mea-
sures must not interfere with Community competition rules also
date from this period.21
In another case, Hasselblad v. Orbison, the Commission, un-
usually, intervened in a national court.22 Hasselblad (GB) Ltd.,
as a kind of pre-emptive strike, had brought proceedings for def-
amation against an individual who had given the Commission
evidence of a breach of Community competition law. The En-
glish Court of Appeal held that to allow a claim for defamation
would be contrary to Article 10, since it would interfere with the
giving of evidence to the Commission, and would create the risk
of conflicts between national court judgments and decisions of
1573, 11 16-23; Ministere public du Kingdom of the Netherlands v. Van Tiggele, Case
82/77, [19781 E.C.R. 25, 23; Pigs Mktg. Bd. v. Redmond, Case 83/78, [1978] E.C.R.
2347, 65; Amsterdam Bulb BV v. Produktschap voor Siergewassen, Case 50/76, [1977]
E.C.R. 137, 11 5-8; Benedetti v. Munari F.lli s.a.s., Case 52/76, [1977] E.C.R. 163, 15;
Tasca, Case 65/75, [1976] E.C.R. 291, 1 5; Societa Sadam v. Comitato Interministeriale
dei Prezzi, Joined Cases 88-90/75, [1976] E.C.R. 323, 6; Russo, [1976] E.C.R. 45, 1 5;
Gali, Case 31/74, [1975] E.C.R. 47, 1 29/30; see also, Hurd v. Jones, Case 44/84, [1986]
E.C.R. 29, 11 38-39, 44-45, 48-49, 58; Toffoli v. Regione de Venetie, Case 10/79, [1979]
E.C.R. 3301, 12; Entreprise F.lli Cucchi v. Avez S.p.A., Case 77/76, [1977] E.C.R. 987,
11 27-35; Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Oberelbe v. Firma Paul G. Bollman, Case 40/69,
[1970] E.C.R. 69, 1 4.
21. See, e.g., Van Eycke v. ASPA N.V., Case 267/86, [1988] E.C.R. 4769, 11 16-20;
ASBL Vereniging van Vlaamse Reisbureaus v. ASBL VZW Sociale Dienst van de Plaatse-
lijke en Gewestelijke Overheidsdiensten, Case 311/85, [1987] E.C.R. 3801, 24; Bu-
reau National Interprofessional du Cognac v. Aubert, Case 136/86, [1986] E.C.R. 4789,
23; Centre belge d'etudes de marche-Telemarketing (CBEM) v. SA Compagnie lux-
enbourgeoise de telediffusion (CLT) & Information publicite Benelux (IPB), Case
311/84, [1985] E.C.R. 3261, 11 16-17; Cullet & Chambre Syndicale des reparateurs
automobiles et detaillants de produits petroliers v. Centre Leclerc Toulouse, Case 231/
83, [1985] E.C.R. 305, 15; Association des Centres distributeurs Edouard LeClerc v.
SARL Aublever, Case 229/83, [1985] E.C.R. 1, It 14, 20; Van de Haar and Kaveka de
Meern BV, Joined Cases 177 & 178/82, [1984] E.C.R. 1797, 1 12; Van Tiggele, [1978]
E.C.R. 25, 1 23; SA GB-INNO, [1977] E.C.R_ 2115, 11 30-33; see also Luc Gyselen, State
Action and the Effectiveness of the EEC Treaty's Competition Provisions, 26 COMMON MKT. L.
REV. 33, 34-35 (1989);Judge ReneJoliet, NationalAnti-competitive Legislation and Commu-
nity Law, 1988 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 16-1, 16-2-16-3 (1989);John Temple Lang, Euro-
pean Competition Law and Member State Action, 10 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 114, 114-18
(1989); John Temple Lang, Community Antitrust Law and Government Measures Relating to
Public and Privileged Enterprises: Article 90 EEC Treaty, 1984 FonDHtaM CORP. L. INST. 543,
544 (1985); Pierre Pescatore, Public and Private Aspects of Community Competition Law,
1986 FORDHAM CORP. L. INsT. 381, 385 (1987); Jean-Francoise Verstrynge, The Obliga-
tions of Member States as Regards Competition in the EEC Treaty, in 1988 FoR.Dram CORP. L.
INsT. 17-1, 17-6-17-7 (Barry Hawk ed., 1989).
22. Hasselblad v. Orbison, [1984] 3 C.M.L.R. 540, 690; see also Wilhelm v.
Bundeskartellamt, Case 14/68, [1969] E.C.R. 1, 13.
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the Commission. 23
F. The Duty to Provide Information to the Commission
By the end of the 1980s, the Court had already established
what has since become a long line of cases based on the princi-
ple that Member States have legal duties under Article 10 to pro-
vide information to the Commission, in particular where the
Commission has reason to believe that it needs the information
in order to decide whether there has been a breach of Commu-
nity law. This principle had first been stated as early as 1962,
under Article 86 in the European Coal and Steel Community
Treaty, which corresponded to Article 10.24
G. The Duty to Resolve Difficulties by Using Community Procedures
From time to time it happens that a Member State finds it
difficult to carry out its obligations under Community law, and it
may finally fail to carry them out. In some circumstances the
Member States have tried to blame the Community institutions
for failing to take action that, the State says, would have avoided
the difficulty.
As early as 1971, in the European Supply Agency case, France
tried to defend its failure to consult the Supply Agency by relying
on the Council's failure to take certain decisions. 25 The Court,
basing itself on the Article in the Euratom Treaty that corre-
sponds to Article 5, rejected France's argument:
[T]he general obligation of cooperation imposed by Article
192, should have induced the defendant [France] to put an
end to the uncertainty on which it relies, by making use of the
means offered to it by the Treaty, which puts at the disposal
of each interested State ... suitable methods for remedying
any lack of action on the part of the Council.2 6
In another case in the same year, on the basis of Article 86
in the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty, the Court
ruled that the duty of cooperation imposed on Member States
obliged a State which considers a system of State aid to be con-
23. See Hasselblad, 3 C.M.L.R. at 692-96.
24. See Netherlands v. High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community,
Case 9/61, [1962] E.C.R. 213, 236.
25. See Commission v. France, Case 7/71, [1971] E.C.R. 1003, 11 16-17.
26. Id. 48.
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trary to the Treaty to use the procedures provided by the Treaty,
rather than taking unilateral action.2 7
H. Fundamental Rights and "General Principles" of Law
By 1990 it had become clear that national authorities were
bound, in the sphere in which Community law applied, by the
fundamental rights principles of Community law, and by the
"general principles of law" such as proportionality and legal cer-
tainty, at least in some circumstances.28 It is now clear that na-
tional authorities are bound by these principles throughout the
sphere of Community law. However, it is still not clear whether
this should be considered the result of Article 10, and the broad
principle is now so clearly stated in the Treaties themselves that
the question no longer has much significance.
I. The Duties of Member States in the Sphere of-External Relations
Certain duties of Member States in the sphere of external
relations had also been based on Article 10, and again it seems
that this was due to the influence of Judge Pierre Pescatore.
In the first of these cases, the Court held that in some cir-
cumstances Member States are legally obliged by Article 10 to act
in international fora on behalf of the Community. 29 This is so in
particular where the Community has exclusive competence over
the subject matter in question, and so should itself be a member
of the international body.
In Opinion 1/76, the Court held that the Community has
exclusive competence to conclude international agreements if
necessary to achieve Community objectives, or if they would af-
fect the operation of the Community's internal rules, even
outside the sphere of external trade.30
27. See Netherlands v. Commission, Case 59/70, [1971] E.C.R. 639, 7 15, 18, 21.
28. See, e.g., The Queen v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries & Food, ex parte Den-
nis Clifford Bostock (U.K), Case C-2/92, [1994] E.C.R. 1-955, 1 16; Wachauf v.
Forstwirtschaft, Case 5/88, [1989] E.C.R 2609, 9 18; see generally John Temple Lang,
Community Constitutional Law: Article 5 EEC Treaty, 27 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 645, 654-56
(1990); John Temple Lang, The Sphere in Which Member States Are Obliged to Comply With
the General Principles of Law and Fundamental Rights Principles, 1991/2 LEGAL ISSUES OF
EUR. INTEGRATION 23 (1991).
29. Commission v. Council of the European Communities, Case 22/70, [1971]
E.C.R. 263, 1 90.
30. See Draft Agreement Establishing a European Laying-up Fund for Inland Wa-
terway Vessels, Opinion 1/76, [1977] E.C.R. 741, 11 3-4, 12; see also Competence of the
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The Court also held that Member States have a duty to use
every means at their disposal to ensure that the Community can
participate in international conventions, either because the
Community has exclusive competence, or because the Council
has decided that the Community should participate. 1
In a third case, also in the 1970s, the Court said that it might
be contrary to Article 10 for a Member State to prejudge or com-
promise the result of internal discussions on the Community's
international negotiating position, or to weaken it in any way.32
More obviously, the Court in a slightly later case held that it
would be contrary to Article 10 for a Member State to do any-
thing that would lead to the Community being in breach of its
obligations under any international agreement to which the
Community is a party, whether or not the State itself is separately
bound by the agreement in question. 3
The Court also held that "Member States are subject to spe-
cial duties of action and abstention in a situation in which the
Commission has submitted to the Council proposals which, al-
though they have not been adopted by the Council, represent
the point of departure for concerted Community action. 34
J. The Duties of the Community Institutions to Member States
In several important judgments the Court extended the
duty of cooperation under Article 10 by ruling that the Commu-
nity Institutions and Member States have reciprocal duties of co-
operation in the Community sphere.35
Subsequently, the Court concluded that Article 10 imposed
a legal obligation on the Commission to give confidential infor-
Community to Conclude International Agreements Concerning Services and the Pro-
tection of Intellectual Property, Opinion 1/94, [1994] E.C.R. 1-5267; Competence of
the Community or One of Its Institutions to Participate in the Third Revised Decision
of the OECD on National Treatment, Opinion 2/92, [1995] E.C.R. 1-521., 1 XIII.
31. Cornelis Kramer, Joined Cases 3-5/76, [1976] E.C.R. 1279, 11 44-45.
32. Commission v. Ireland, Case 61/77, [1977] E.C.R. 417, 11 37, 64, 83-86.
33. See Mainz v. Kupferberg, Case 104/81, [1982] E.C.R. 3641, 1 13.
34. Commission v. Germany, Case C-433/03, [2005] ECR 1-6985, 1 65; see also
Commission v. United Kingdom, Case 804/79, [1981] E.C.R. 1045, 1 28; Commission v.
Luxemburg, Case C-266/03, [2005] ECR 1-4805, 1 59.
35. Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, Case 94/87, [1989] E.C.R. 175,
6-8; France v. European Parliament, Joined Cases 358/85 & 51/86, [1988] E.C.R.
4821, 34; Commission v. Belgium, Case 52/84, [1986] E.C.R. 89, 16; Hurd v. Jones,
Case 44/84, [1986] E.C.R. 29, 38; Luxemburg v. European Parliament, Case 230/81,
[1983] E.C.R. 255, 37.
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mation to a national court enforcing Community law.3 6
K. The Case Law Situation by 1990
Vlad Constantinesco, writing in 1987, said that the Court
had used Article 10 (then Article 5) as a way of reinforcing the
effectiveness of other obligations under Community law, and as
a basis for limiting the exercise of national powers, in the ab-
sence of precise obligations under Community law.3 7 Article 10
must be linked to a specific obligation, and can reinforce a pre-
existing obligation.
It will be seen that by 1990 there was already a considerable
body of case law based explicitly on Article 10. Most of the cases
concerned the principle described here as the duty to give full
effect to Community law. Since few direct actions based on Arti-
cle 10 were initiated in the Court of Justice, most of the cases in
which the Court referred explicitly to Article 10 (and some in
which Article 10 was applied without being referred to explicitly)
were cases that had begun in national courts and were referred
to the Court under what is now Article 234 (then Article 177).
Most such cases are necessarily concerned primarily with the ef-
fective application and enforcement of Community law at the
national level, and primarily with questions about effective appli-
cation by national courts.
By 1990, the duty to give "full effect" to Community law had
already given rise to several identifiable lines of cases, and the
judgments in those cases already tend to cite previous judgments
on similar issues, rather than referring on every occasion to the
duty to give full effect. The duty under Article 10 to give "full
effect" to Community law is referred to usually when a new situa-
tion arises in which there is no direct precedent, and the Court
chooses to base its judgment or its reference to Article 10 on the
36. SeeJ.J. Zwartveld, Case C-2/88, (1990] E.C.R. 1-4405, 16-19, 21-22.
37. See Vlad Constantinesco, L'artile 5 CEE, de la bonne foi d la loyautg com-
munautaire, in Du DROIT INTERNATIONALE AU DROIT DE L'INT9GRATION 97, 110-11 (Fran-
cesco Capotori et al. eds., 1987) (citing Henri Gullet & Chambre syndicale des
r~parateurs automobiles et d~taillants de produits p~troliers v. Centre Leclerc A Tou-
louse & Centre Leclerc A Saint-Orens-de-Gameville, Case 231/83, (1985] E.C.R. 305;
BayWa AG v. Bundesanstalt ffir landwirtschaftliche Marktordnung, Joined Cases 146,
192 & 193/81, [1982] E.C.R. 1503; Firma Wilhelm Fromme v. Bundesanstalt ffir
landwirtschaftliche Marktordnung, Case 54/81, (1982] E.C.R. 1449; Geddo v. Ente Na-
zionale Risi, Case 2/73, [1973] E.C.R. 865; Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v.
Metro-SB-GroB mdrkte GmbH & Co. KG., Case 78/70, [1971] E.C.R 487).
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principle of "full effect," in order to explain a new example of
that principle.
The Court was therefore already applying Article 10 in prac-
tice without always mentioning it explicitly, when there were pre-
vious judgments (some of which themselves had mentioned Arti-
cle 10) to which reference could be made. The van Duyn-Moor-
man cases are only the most striking example of this. The effect,
as already mentioned, was to make Article 10 less obviously im-
portant. Another effect was that the Court never thought it nec-
essary or useful to attempt to write any general statement or
formula covering or describing the whole range of Article 10
case law. Its scope was already too wide and too varied, and the
Court did not need to devise any such general formulation. It is
not easy to state as a useful single principle, for example, both
the rules on full effect and the rules on cooperation in external
relations, although they are both based on Article 10.
It will also be seen that the difficulty of classifying cases
under Article 10 had already become clear, at least as far as the
cases on the duty to give full effect are concerned. Some of the
cases state the principle in general terms, others state merely
whatever specific rule is regarded as relevant to the case before
the Court. As the precedents accumulate, the tendency to cite
only the directly relevantjudgments (a perfectly normal result of
judicial economy in writing judgments) increases. The result is
increasing sub-division or speciation (Article 10 seems to lead to
biological metaphors).
Although so many of the cases in which the Court referred
to Article 10 were referred to it by national courts, the national
courts themselves seem to have understood the broad duty to
give full effect without being very explicit about what they were
doing. This is partly because national courts frequently ask ques-
tions under Article 234 without first giving judgments or under-
taking detailed analysis. It may well have been that national
courts, like the Court of Justice itself, felt that Article 10 was too
vague and general in its term to be the subject of useful textual
analysis. But the basic explanation probably is that the two prin-
ciples that are the foundation of the duty of national courts to
give full effect were already well known: the principle that many
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rules of Community law are directly applicable,3 8 and the princi-
ple that Community law prevails over national law where they
are inconsistent.3' Both of these principles had been stated by
the Court in seminal judgments in the 1960s, and national
judges were well aware of them, even if not all of their implica-
tions had yet been worked out.
There is therefore a contrast between the "full effect" case
law, on the one hand, and the case law on some of the other
principles based on Article 10, on the other. In the case law on
the duty to give full effect, the Court clearly felt that the princi-
ple was already established, and could be taken for granted, and
that in each case the Court was simply applying (or at least draw-
ing out the implications of) a well-recognized principle to spe-
cific facts. The Court did not seem to consider that it was adopt-
ing new or seminaljudgments. One of the most important judg-
ments concerning full effect, Francovich, discussed below, in
which Article 10 was referred to explicitly and which was clearly
seminal in the sense that it led to a series of important judg-
ments, was given only in 1991. In contrast, in the judgments on
the duties under Article 10 in external relations, and the recipro-
cal duties of Community institutions, the Court (and importantly
also the Advocates General) were obviously aware of the novelty,
as well as the significance, of what was being decided. Some of
this awareness was certainly due, as already mentioned, to Judge
Pescatore, as both his questions in Court and his extra-judicial
writings made clear during that period.
Another reason why the Court did not mention Article 10
expressly, as often as might have been expected, is that in some
situations the result required by Article 10 could also have been
arrived at on other grounds. This is most clearly true of the du-
ties of national authorities, in the sphere in which Community
law applies, to respect (and to ensure respect for) fundamental
rights principles and the "general principles of law" such as pro-
portionality, legal certainty, legitimate certainty, legitimate ex-
pectations, and non-discrimination. In cases involving national
authorities' duties to comply with these principles, Article 10 is
referred to, if it is referred to at all, merely to confirm and sup-
38. NV Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v.
Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration, Case 26/62, [1963] E.C.R. 1.
39. Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L., Case 6/64, [1964] E.C.R. 585.
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port a conclusion reached on other grounds. This does not
mean that, even in the cases in question, Article 10 has no effect:
the Community legal order is thought of by the Court as a seam-
less whole, and there are a number of leading cases that could
have been (and in some cases were) decided on several grounds
of principle.
In short, even in the period before 1990 the Court was al-
ready using Article 10 as what it has since become, a stimulus
and a basis for the first judgments on new issues, but an Article
that, because it is so general in its terms, is not very useful in
subsequent judgments on the same issue. As the number of po-
tential new lines of cases appeared to decline, the potential of
Article 10 was underestimated, and the Commission became less
imaginative.
II. THE SECOND PERIOD: THE ELABORATION OF THE
BASIC PRINCIPLES
By 1990, it was estimated that the Court had already cited
Article 10 in more than 120judgments. By 2000, the next date
at which it is useful to summarize the developments, there were
many more. But because of the Court's practice of citing previ-
ous judgments for which Article 10 was the ultimate legal basis
rather than citing Article 10 itself, estimating the total number
of judgments ultimately based on Article 10 now seems unrealis-
tic and no longer useful.
A. The Duty to Give Full Effect to Community Law
The duty under Article 10 to give full effect to Community
law rules during the decade 1980-1990 clearly separated into
three duties: the duty to enforce Community law rules against
national authorities, the duty to protect fully rights given to pri-
vate parties by Community law, and the duty to enforce Commu-
nity rules against private parties.
The decade began with two important and well-known judg-
ments: Factortame4° and Francovich.4' In fact, in spite of the sur-
prise and controversy that resulted from them, neither case in-
40. The Queen v. Sec'y of State for Transp., ex parte: Factortame Ltd. & Others,
Case C-213/89, [1990] E.C.R. 1-2433. In Intervention Board for Agricultural Produce v.
Penycoed Farming Partnership, Case C-230/01, [2004] E.C.R. 1-937, 41, the Court held
that "Member States' obligation under Article 10 ... includes the power to take direct
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volved entirely new issues-they merely made clear the implica-
tions of what the Court had ruled previously. In Factortame, the
Court decided that national courts had a duty to disregard any
rule of national law that interfered with the full application of
Community law.42 That had been decided previously in Sim-
menthal, which itself had been striking because the Court held
that national courts have both the duty and the power to set
aside even national primary legislation, and to do so even if the
courts in question would have no power to set aside the legisla-
tion as being contrary to the national constitution.4" In
Factortame, the genuine novelty lay in the fact that the national
law had to set aside a rule that no national court had power to
suspend, provisionally, an Act of the U.K. Parliament.44 The ef-
fect of setting aside this rule was therefore to oblige and em-
power U.K. courts to adopt a new kind of remedy that had never
previously been considered. More recently, in Unibet the Court
repeated that the Treaty was "not intended" to create new reme-
dies in national courts to ensure observance of Community law,
but "it would be otherwise only if it were apparent from the over-
all scheme of the national legal system in question that no legal
remedy existed which made it possible to ensure, even indirectly,
respect for an individual's rights under Community law."45 In
other words, Article 10 imposes a duty to invent a new national
procedural remedy only when necessary.
In Francovich, the Court said that national courts have a duty
to award compensation to private parties for breach, by the State
or State bodies, of Community law rules.46 In fact, this had been
action against the producer with a view to recovering the amount payable" (emphasis
added).
41. See Francovich & Bonifaci & Others v. Italy, Joined Cases C-6 & C-9/90, [1991]
E.C.R. 1-5357. There is a corresponding rule under the European Economic Area
Agreement. See Sveinbj6rnsdottir v. Iceland, Case E-9/97, [1998] EFTA Ct. Rep. 95.
Recently, the Court has stated some of the rules limiting State liability for breach of
Community law. See, e.g., Brinkmann Tabakfabriken GmbH v. Skatteministeriet, Case C-
319/96, [1998) E.C.R. 1-5255, 25-33; The Queen v. H.M. Treasury, ex parte British
Telecommunications pic., Case C-392/93, [1996] E.C.R. 1-1631, 46; see a/soJohn Tem-
ple Lang, The Principle of Effective Protection of Community Law Rights, in JUDICLAL REVIEW
IN EUROPEAN UNION LAw 235-74 (David O'Keefe ed., 2000).
42. See Factortame, [1990] E.C.R. 2433, 20.
43. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal SpA., Case 106/77,
[1978] E.C.R. 629, 21-26.
44. See Factortame, [1990] E.C.R. 2433, 1 17-23.
45. Unibet Ltd. v. Justitiekanslern, Case C-432/05, [2007] E.C.R. 1-2271, 40-41.
46. See Francovich, [1991] E.C.R. 1-5357, 37.
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said before by the Court, in Humblet,4 7 and by the Advocate Gen-
eral in Russo v. AMA4 4 but in the context of a claim primarily
for repayment of a specific sum of tax that had been imposed
contrary to Community law, and without the full discussion of
the principle of State liability that was included in the Francovich
judgment. It had not previously been made clear that a claim
for an unliquidated amount of compensation, as distinct from a
refund, could be made. The novelty lay also in the fact that the
national courts are obliged to award damages (provided that cer-
tain conditions are fulfilled) for breach of or failure to imple-
ment a directive, although directives in general have no direct
effects in themselves, but are intended to be implemented by
national measures. The conditions are that the Community law
rule must be intended to create rights for individuals, the breach
is sufficiently serious, and there is a direct causal link between
the breach and the loss for which compensation is claimed.
The Francovich judgment draw attention to two principles,
both based on Article 10 as previously mentioned, governing the
enforcement of Community law by national courts, both against
public authorities and against private parties. The substantive
and procedural rules applicable are those provided by national
law ("national autonomy"), but subject to two overriding princi-
ples. The first is the principle of "equivalence," which requires
that rights given by Community law must be given protection
equivalent to, or not less favourable than, that given to corre-
sponding rights under national law.49 The second is the princi-
ple of "effectiveness," which requires that rights given by Com-
munity law must be protected "effectively." This principle is
gradually obliging the Court to define rights given by Commu-
nity law more fully, when that is necessary to decide what "effec-
tive" or full protection requires. 50
The Francovich judgment was controversial because it was
thought that governments of Member States might have to pay
47. See Humblet v. Belgium, Case 6/60, [1960] E.C.R. 559, 569; see also Nat'l Pen-
sions Office v. Jonkman & Vercheval, Joined Cases C-231-233/06, slip op., 37 (ECJ
June 21, 2007) (not yet reported); Wells v. Sec'y of State for Transp., Local Gov't and
the Regions, Case C-201/02, (2004] E.C.R. 1-723, 64.
48. Russo v. AlMA, Case 60/75, (1976] E.C.R. 45, 9.
49. See Ferwerda v. Producktschap voor Vee en Vlees, Case 265/78, [1980] E.C.R.
61, 11 10-12; Rewe v. Landwirtschaftskammer ffir das Saarland, Case 33/76, [1976]
E.C.R. 1989, 5.
50. See Ferwerda, [1980] E.C.R. 61, 71 10-12; Rewe, [1976] E.C.R. 1989, 1 5.
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large amounts of compensation, not because there was real
doubt about the correctness of the Court's legal analysis. (The
direct effects of directives against the State had been long estab-
lished by 1991). Since 1991, when Francovich was decided, there
have been several Intergovernmental Conferences discussing the
revision or even replacement of the Community Treaties, and it
has not been seriously suggested that the judgment should be
reversed. No doubt it was understood that the possibility of hav-
ing to pay compensation would be an important influence pro-
moting the proper respect for the Community law obligations of
Member States. Also, there would have been no basis, and no
justification, for depriving private parties of their rights under
Community law against Member States.
B. The Duty of National Authorities Not to Deprive Community Rules
of Their Effectiveness
As already mentioned, in the 1970s the Court had repeat-
edly held that national measures must not interfere with the op-
eration of the Community's agricultural policy. Cases of that
kind arose seldom between 1990 and 2000. Instead, in that dec-
ade in a series of judgments the Court said that national mea-
sures, whether legislative, regulatory or decisional, must not de-
prive Community competition law of its effectiveness. This is
clearly the same principle as that in the agricultural policy cases,
and both are based on Article 10.
This broad principle51 led to several specific rules, which in
51. For the cases before 1990 see supra, note 20. There are many cases concerning
the duty not to interfere with the operation of Community competition law. See, e.g.,
Centro Servizi Spediporto v. Spedizioni Marittima del Golfo, Case C-96/94m, [1995]
E.C.R. 1-2883, 20; Esso Espafiola v. Canary Islands, Case C-134/94, [1995] E.C.R. I-
4223, 9118; DIP v. Comune di Bassano del Grappa, Case C-140/94, [1995] E.C.R. 1-3257,
1 14; Germany v. Delta, Case C-153/93, [1994] E.C.R. 1-2517, 1 14; Peralta, Case C-379/
92, [1994] E.C.R. 1-3453, 1 21; Heukske, Case C-401/92, [1994] E.C.R. 1-2199, 16; van
Schaik, Case C-55/93, [1994] E.C.R. 1-4837, 1 22; Meng, Case C-2/91, [1993] E.C.R. I-
5751, 1 14; Bundesanstalt ffir den Gfiterfernverkehr v. Reiff, Case C-185/91 [1993]
E.C.R. 1-5801, 1 14; Schadeverzekeringen, Case C-245/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-5851, 1 10;
Corbeau, Case C-320/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-2533, 1 11; Netherlands v. Commission, Case
C-48/90, [1992] E.C.R. 1-565, 1 23; Batista Morais, Case C-60/91, [1992] E.C.R. 1-2085,
1 11; Tileorassi v. Pliroforissis, Case C-260/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-2925, 1 35; H6fner v.
Macrotron, Case C-41/90, [1991] E.C.R. 1-1979, 9 26; see also Mauri v. Ministero della
Giustizia, Case C-250/03, [2007] E.C.R. 1-1267, 1 29-30; United Pan-Europe Communi-
cations v. Belgium, Case C-250/06, [2007] E.C.R. -, 1 17 (ECJ Dec. 13, 2007) (LEXIS,
Eurcom Library, Cases File); Servizi Ausiliari Dottori Commercialisti v. Calafiori, Case
C-451/03, [2006] E.C.R. 1-2941, 1 23; Cipolla v. Fazari, Case C-94/04, [2006] E.C.R. I-
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their current form can be summarized as follows:
- States may not without sufficient justification create or ex-
tend a dominant position. It is unjustified to set up a mo-
nopoly which cannot meet the demand for the services in
question, since the monopoly prevents them being pro-
vided by others.
- States may not order or encourage conduct contrary to
Community competition rules.
- States may not create a situation in which a dominant enter-
prise has a conflict of interest and is enabled to abuse a
dominant position, because it has been given power to regu-
late or supply services to its competitors.
Article 86 (on competition rules concerning State-owned
and privileged enterprises) is regarded as a specific example of
the duties under Article 10.
It is important to understand that the duty under Article 10
not to interfere with the operation of a Community rule, a Com-
munity policy, or a Community institution is distinct from, and
goes further than, the duty to have no national law rules that are
directly incompatible with Community law. The duty not to inter-
fere makes it necessary to look at how the two bodies of law oper-
ate, or should operate, in practice.
C. "Effective" Implementation of Directives and Regulations
The definition of directives in the Treaty describes them as
binding on Member States as to the result to be achieved, but
leaving it to national authorities to decide the form and means.
The obligations imposed on Member States by this Article do
not obviously need to be supplemented by duties based on Arti-
cle 10, but the Court has referred to Article 10 several times in
11421, 46-47, 54; Consorzio Industri Fiammiferi v. Autoriti Garante della Concor-
renza e del Mercato, Case C-198/01, [2003] E.C.R. 1-8055, 45; Arduino, Case C-35/99,
[2002] E.C.R. 1-1529, 34; Pavlov v. Stichting Pensioenfonds Medische Specialisten,
Case C-180/98, [2000] E.C.R. 1-6451, 127; CNSD v. Commission, Case T-513/93,
[2000] E.C.R. 11-1807, 39; Albany International v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds
Textielindustrie, Case C-67/96, [1999] E.C.R. 1-5751, 65; Irish Sugar v. Commission,
Case T-228/97, [1999] E.C.R. 11-2629, 130; Commission v. Italy, Case C-35/96, [1998]
E.C.R. 1-3851, 53; Futura Participations v. Administration des Contributions, Case C-
250/95, [1997] E.C.R. 1-2471, 19; Hoechst v. Commission, Case 46/87, [1989] E.C.R.
2859, 33. In these cases the Court said Member States must "refrain from introducing
or maintaining in force measures . .. which may render ineffective the competition
rules applicable to undertakings." Autotrasporti Librandi v. Cuttica Spedizioni e Servizi,





It has traditionally been considered that Community law
could not include rules of criminal law.53 As a result, it was com-
mon in both regulations and directives to provide that Member
States should legislate for appropriate penalties for breach of,
for example, Community fisheries legislation. Article 10, how-
ever, goes further: it imposes a duty on national authorities to
impose penalties to enforce Community rules "effectively."54 In
other words, they must not only provide effective penalties in
legislation, they must enforce the legislation effectively.
A more surprising conclusion was reached by the Court in
Marleasing," and repeated in later cases, in which it was held
that national courts have a legal duty under Article 10 "as far as
possible" to interpret and apply national law so as to be consis-
tent with a directive. This duty applies in cases between private
parties, and not merely as against the Member State.5 6
In another perhaps surprising series of cases, the Court has
said that even before a directive comes into force, national au-
thorities must not do anything that would compromise the result
required by the directive.57
52. See, e.g., Commission v. Austria, Case C-507/04, slip op., 7 344 (ECJ July 21,
2007) (not yet published) (mentioning Article 10 in the operative part of the judgment,
without discussion).
53. But see Commission v. Council, Case C-176/03, [2005] E.C.R. 1-7879, 5.
54. Lidl Italia v. Comune di Arcole, Case C-315/05, [2006] E.C.R. 1-11181, 58;
Berlusconi, Case C-387/02, [2005] E.C.R. 1-3565, 65; Kamer van Koophandel en
Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd., Case C-167/01, [2003] E.C.R. 1-10155,
62; Ebony Maritime v. Brindisi, Case C-177/95, [1997] E.C.R. 1-1111, 35; An-
klagemyndigheden v. Hansen, Case C-326/88, [1990] E.C.R. 1-2911, 7 17; Commission
v. Greece, Case 68/88, [1989] E.C.R. 2965, 24.
55. Marleasing v. Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion, Case C-106/89,
[1990] E.C.R. 1-4135, 8.
56. See, e.g., Pfeiffer v. Deutsches Rotes Kruez, Case C-397/01, [2004] E.C.R. I-
8835, 7 110; Connect Austria Gesellschaft ffir Telekommunikation, Case C-462/99,
[2003] E.C.R. 1-5197, 38; Mau v. Bundesanstalt ffr Arbeit, Case C-160/01, [2003]
E.C.R. 1-4791, 7 35.
57. See, e.g., Commission v. Belgium, Case C-422/05, slip op., 62 (ECJ, Nov. 28
2007) (not yet published); Bund Naturschutz in Bayern v. Freistaat Bayern, Case C-244/
05, [2006] E.C.R. 1-8445, 7 46,47, 51; Stichting Zuid-Hollandse Milieufederatie v. Min-
ister van Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit, Case C-138/05, [2006] E.C.R. 1-8339,
It 42-44; Adeneler v. Ellinikos Organismos Galaktos [ELOG], Case C-212/04, [2006]
E.C.R. 1-6057, 7 121-24; Stichting Zuid-Hollandse Milieufederatie v. College voor de
toelating van bestrijdingsmiddelen, Case C-316/04, [2005] E.C.R. 1-9759, 42; Rieser
Internationale Transporte v. Autobahnen-und SchnellstraBen-Finanzeirungs-AG [As-
finag], Case C-157/02, [2004] E.C.R 1-1477, 66; Inter-Environnement Wallonie v.
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D. The Right to Judicial Review to Protect Community Law Rights
In the years 1990-2000, the Court gave a series ofjudgments
recognizing that there is a right of judicial review of national
measures, in order to protect Community law rights. National
courts may therefore be obliged to review national decisions in
order to ensure that full effect is given to Community law. It is
only if a case can be brought before a national court or tribunal
that a question of Community law can be referred, if necessary,
to the Court of Justice under Article 234. Again, the first cases
on the right to judicial review had been earlier,5" and then the
Wallonne, Case C-129/96, [1997] E.C.R. 1-7411, 145; see also Opinion of Advocate Gen-
eral Mengozzi, Commission v. Netherlands, Case C-523/04, [2007] E.C.R. 1-3267, 149
(negotiation of a new air traffic agreement with the United States after EC Regulations
adopted and before they came into force, contrary to Article 10).
58. See Unectef v. Heylens, Case 222/86, [1987] E.C.R. 4097, 1 14; Johnston v.
Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, Case 222/84, (1986] E.C.R. 1651, 19
17-18. Since then, the duty to provide judicial review of national measures and Com-
munity acts has been referred to in numerous cases. See, e.g., Opinion of Advocate Gen-
eral Maduro, Arcor v. Germany, Case C-55/06, 91 96-99 (ECJ July 18, 2007) (Court
decision not yet issued); Alrosa Company Ltd. v. Commission, Case T-170/06, slip op.,
1 194 et seq. (ECJJuly 11, 2007) (not yet published); Unibet v.Justitiekanslern, Case C-
432/05, [2007] E.C.R. 1-2271, 37; Commission v. France, Case C-232/05, [2006]
E.C.R. 1-10071, 57; Wilson v. Ordre des avocats du barreau de Luxembourg, Case C-
506/04, [2006] E.C.R. 1-8613, 45; R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc. v. Commis-
sion, Case C-131/03 P, [2006] E.C.R. 1-7795, 99 79 et seq.; Traghetti del Mediterraneo v.
Italy, Case C-173/03, [2006] E.C.R. 1-5177, 1 33; Yusuf v. Council, Case T-306/01,
[2005] E.C.R. 11-3533, 261; Gaston Schul v. van Landbouw, Case C-461/03, [2005]
E.C.R. 1-10513, 22; Commission v. T-Mobile Austria, Case C-141/02 P, [2005] E.C.R. I-
1283, 1 20; Rothley v. Parliament, Case C-167/02 P, [2004] E.C.R. 1-3149, 46; Siemens
v. Hauptverband der 6sterreichischen Sozialversicherungstrdger, Case C-314/01,
[2004] E.C.R. 1-2549, 50; Safalero v. Genova, Case C-13/01, [2003] E.C.R. 1-8679,
50; P&O European Ferries v. Commission, Case T-116/01, [2003] E.C.R. 11-2957,1 209;
Union de Pequefios Agricultores v. Council, Case C-50/00 P, [2002] E.C.R. 1-6677, 42;
MRAX v. Belgium, Case C-459/99, [2002] E.C.R. 1-6591, 101;Joynson v. Commission,
Case T-231/99, [2002] E.C.R. 11-2085, 91 32-34; Commission v. Austria, Case C-424/99,
[2001] E.C.R. 1-9285, 45; Empresas Navieras de Lineas Regulares [Analir] v. Adminis-
traci6n General del Estado, Case C-205/99, [2001] E.C.R. 1-1271, 1 39; Nachi v. Krefeld,
Case C-239/99, [2001] E.C.R. 1-1197, 1 34; Kofisa Italia v. Ministero delle Finanze, Case
C-1/99, [2001] E.C.R. 1-207, 1 47; Krombach v. Bamberski, Case C-7/98, [2000] E.C.R.
1-1935, 44; Dounias v. Ikonomikon, Case C-228/98, [2000] E.C.R. 1-577, 69; Nether-
lands v. Van der Wal, Case C-174/98 P, [2000] E.C.R. I-1, 22; Upjohn Ltd. v.
Medicines Act Licensing Authority, Case C-120/97, [1999] E.C.R 1-223, 1 25; Coote v.
Granada Hospitality Ltd., Case C-185/97, [1998] E.C.R. 1-5199, 20; Antonissen v.
Commission, Case C-393/96 P (R), [1997] E.C.R. 1-441, 36; Atlanta Fruchthandel-
sgesellschaft v. Bundesamt ffir Ernhrung und Forstwirtschaft, Case C-465/93, [1995]
E.C.R. 1-3761, 20; Borelli v. Commission, Case C-97/91, [1992] E.C.R. 1-6313, 13;
Verholen v. Sociale Verzekeringsbank Amsterdam, Case C-87/90, [1991] E.C.R. 1-3757,
24; Vlassopoulou v. Ministerium ftir Justiz, Bundes-und Europaangelegenheiten Ba-
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principle came to be stated more generally.
The Court has recently, in the Unibetjudgment, confirmed
that, "[u] nder the principle of cooperation laid down in Article
10 EC, it is for the Member States to ensure judicial protection
of an individual's rights under Community law."59  The Court
has also recently, in City Motors, explained what is meant by "ef-
fective" judicial review.60
In the case of acts of Community institutions, Article 230
gives a private party the right to challenge the validity of an act
that is of "direct and individual concern" to the party challeng-
ing it. 6 1 In the case of general Community measures, which can-
not be challenged in this way, there is in principle a right to
judicial review that can be exercised through national courts,6 2
although national courts have themselves no power to annul an
act of a Community institution or to declare it invalid.63 A pri-
vate party may rely, before a national court, on the invalidity of a
Community act that is pleaded against it (Article 241, ex-184, EC
made that clear). It seems that national courts also have duties
under Article 10 to allow actions for declarations that general
Community measures are invalid, even though this can only be
done if the national court refers the question of validity to the
Court of Justice.64
den-Wfirttemberg, Case C-340/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-2357, 22; Parliament v. Council,
Case 302/87, [1988] E.C.R. 5615, 20; Commission v. Belgium, Case C-249/88, [1991]
E.C.R. 1-1275, 25; Les Verts v. Parliament, Case 294/83, [1986] E.C.R. 1339, 23.
59. Unibet, [2007] E.C.R. 1-2271, 38.
60. See City Motors Groep (NV) v. Citroen Belux (NV), Case C-421/05, [2007]
E.C.R. 1-653, 1 31-36.
61. See Union de Pequefios Agricultores v. Council of the European Union, Case
C-50/OOP, [2002] E.C.R. 1-6677, 11 44, 45.
62. See id.
63. See Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lubeck-Ost., Case 314/85, [1987] E.C.R. 4199,
15. But see Atlanta Fruchthandelsgesellschaft mbH v. Bundesamt fur Ernahrung und
Forstwirtschaft, Case C-465/93, [1995] E.C.R. 1-3761, 21-22 ("coherence of the sys-
tem of interim legal protection therefore requires that national courts should also be
able to order suspension of enforcement of a national administrative measure based on
a Community regulation, the legality of which is contested").
64. SeeJohn Temple Lang, Declarations, Regional Authorities, Subsidiarity Regional Pol-
icy Measures and the Constitutional Treaty, 29 EUR. L. REv. 94, 105 (2004); John Temple
Lang, Actions for Declarations that Community Regulations Are Invalid: The Duties of National
Courts Under Article 1OEC, 28 EUR. L. REv. 102, 111 (2003).
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E. The Duty of National Courts to Raise Questions of Community
Law on Their Own Initiative
The period 1990-2000 also saw the emergence of a line of
judgments concerning the duty of national courts to raise ques-
tions of Community law on their own initiative.65
An important example of this principle was Eco Swiss China
Time v. Benetton.6 6 In that case it was held that national courts in
Member States must, on their own initiative, refuse to enforce an
arbitral award if the award is contrary to Article 81 EC, because
Article 81 is public policy and overrides private agreements to
submit disputes to arbitration.67
F. The Duty to Inform the Commission
Repeated judgments confirmed that Member States have a
duty to inform the Commission about the measures they have
taken to implement directives, and to provide information re-
quired by the Commission to see if an infringement of Commu-
nity law has occurred.
This is similar to the duty, accepted in various judgments, to
consult and work with the Commission to overcome difficulties,
rather than trying to use the supposed difficulties as excuses for
not carrying out the Member States' obligations.68
65. See, e.g., J. van der Weerd v. Minister van Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwal-
iteit, Joined Cases C-222/05 & C-225/05 (ECJ June 7, 2007) (not yet reported);Jeroen
van Schijndel &Johannes Nicolaas Cornelis van Veen v. Stichting Pensioenfonds voor
Fysiotherapeuten, Joined Cases C-430/93 & C-431/93, [1995] E.C.R. 1-4705, 1 13-15;
Peterbroeck, Van Campenhout & Cie SCS v. Belgium, Case C-312/93, [1995] E.C.R. I-
4599, 21; Verholen v. Sociale Verzekeringsbank, Joined Cases C-87/90 & C-89/90,
[1991] E.C.R. 1-3757, 11 12-16.
66. Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton Int'l (NV), Case C-126/97, [1999]
E.C.R. 1-3055, 11 36-41.
67. See id. 41.
68. See Commission v. Spain, Case C-499/99, [2002] E.C.R. 1-6031, 24; Commis-
sion v. France, Case C-261/99, [2001] ECR 1-2537, 24; Commission v. Belgium, Case
C-378/98, [2001] E.C.R. 1-5107, 31; Commission v. Portugal, Case C-404/97, [2000]
E.C.R. 1-4897, 1 40; Commission v. Belgium, Case C-75/97, [1999] ECR 1-3671, 88;
Commission v. Germany, Case C-217/88, [1990] E.C.R. 1-2879, 33; Commission v.
Germany, Case 94/87, [1989] E.C.R. 175, 1 9; Commission v. Belgium, Case 52/84,
[1986] E.C.R 89, 16; Commission v. United Kingdom, Case 804/79, [1981] E.C.R.
1045, 1 32. The duty to cooperate in good faith with inquiries of the Commission
includes an obligation to provide all information requested for the purpose. See, e.g.,
Commission v. Belgium, Case C-275/04, [2006] E.C.R. 1-9883, 11 77, 82-85; Commis-
sion v. Germany, Case C-105/02, [2006] E.C.R. 1-9659, 1 29, 60, 87; Saxonia
Edelmetalle GmbH v. Commission, Joined Cases T-111/01 & T-133/01, [2005] E.C.R.
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G. The Duty to Protect Community Law Rights Against
Private Parties
In the French Farmers case, the Court decided that national
authorities and courts have a duty under Article 10 to protect
rights given by Community law against interference from other
private parties, as well as against interference from State authori-
ties.6 9
This is obviously an important principle, and it is perhaps
surprising that it has since given rise to relatively few cases. In a
more recent case, more explicitly based on constitutional princi-
ples and on the need to reconcile fundamental rights, it was
held that authorities may authorise a lawful and peaceful protest
even if it interferes to a limited extent with free movement of
goods, because the right of peaceful protest is a consequence of
the fundamental right to freedom of expression and freedom of
assembly.70
H. The Duty to Keep Information Confidential
Under the former competition law procedural Regulation
17/62, the Commission was obliged to keep confidential certain
kinds of information that it obtains in competition cases, but was
obliged by the same Regulation to give this information to na-
tional competition authorities. The Court in Samenwerkende held
that Article 10 obliged the national authorities to ensure that the
11-1579, 6; United Kingdom v. Commission, Case C-46/03, [2005] E.C.R. 1-10167,
40; Commission v. Italy, Case C-456/03, [2005] E.C.R. 1-5335, 26, 46; Lidl Italia Sri v.
Commune di Stradella, Case C-303/04, [2005] E.C.R. 1-7865, 17; Italy v. Commission,
Case C-400/99, [2005] E.C.R. 1-3657, 1 48, 55; Commission v. Italy, Case C-82/03,
[2004] E.C.R. 1-6635, 15; Commission v. Luxembourg, Case C-478/01, [2003] E.C.R.
1-2351, 24; Commission v. Spain, Case C-404/00, [2003] E.C.R. 1-6695, 26; see also
Germany v. Commission, Case C-344/01, [2004] E.C.R. 1-2081, 17 79-81 (defining the
burden of proof).
69. Commission v. France, Case C-265/95, [1997] E.C.R. 1-6959, 7 55, 56, 63
[hereinafter French Farmers].
70. Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzuge v. Austria, Case
C-112/00, [2003] E.C.R. 1-5659, 59, 64, 94; see also Int'l Transp. Workers' Fed'n v.
Viking Line ABP, Case C-438/05, slip op., 55 (ECJ Dec. 11, 2007) (not yet reported)
(holding that a collective agreement intended to deter Viking from changing the State
of registration of a ship was a restriction on freedom of establishment and that Article
43 EC can confer rights in a private undertaking which can be asserted against a trade
union and such a restriction could be justified if it is suitable to attain a legitimate
objective and does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve it).
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duty of confidentiality was "given full effect."'" In other words,
the Court used Article 10 as a basis for filling what would other-
wise have been an anomalous gap in the law.
I. A Duty to Take Positive Measures to Promote Community Objectives
In Van Munster the Court said that national authorities may
have a legal duty to take positive measures to promote recog-
nized Community objectives-in that case, the objectives of free
movement of workers, and the objective of allowing workers in
other Member States to benefit from social welfare regimes.7 2
This had previously been stated by the Court in the Fisheries
cases, where the Community objective was the conservation of
fish stocks.7 3 In the Fisheries case the scientific advice about what
needed to be done was clear. In Van Munster, there was a spe-
cific gap in the Community measures on social welfare for mi-
grant workers, and the Court considered that Article 10 imposed
an obligation to fill the gap. However, there can only be a duty
under Article 10 if the relevant Community objective is precisely
defined." There can be no broad obligation under Article 10 to
promote Community objectives that need, in practice, to be the
subject of Community legislation to clarify the details: the objec-
tive must have already been stated precisely if it is to be justicia-
ble.
J. Restriction of Freedoms Guaranteed by Community Law
The duty to restrict freedoms given by Community law only
for a legitimate purpose in the public interest and by propor-
tional means emerged as an important source of case law in the
period 1990-2000. The case law developed in connection with
freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services. This
duty should probably be regarded as based on Article 10, but it
could also be regarded as a deduction from the fact that the
71. See Samenwerkende Elektricteits-Produktiebedrijven v. Commission, Case T-
39/90, [1991] E.C.R. 11-1497, 57; see also Samenwerkende Elektricteits-Produk-
tiebedrijven v. Commission, Case C-36/92 P, [1994] E.C.R. 1-1911, 37.
72. Van Munster v. Rijksdienst voor Pensioenen, Case C-165/91, [1994] E.C.R. I-
4661, 34-35.
73. Commission v. United Kingdom, Case 32/79, [1980] E.C.R_ 2403, 19; see also
Pluimveeslachterij, Joined Cases 47-48/83, [1984] E.C.R. 1721, 29.
74. Association des Centres distributeurs Edouard Leclerc v. SARL "Au ble vert,"
Case 229/83, [1985] E.C.R. 1, 20, 30.
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Treaty explicitly envisages restrictions on free movement of
goods, but is less explicit about freedom of establishment and
freedom to provide services, which clearly could not be absolute
freedoms. However, it is not easy to see how far Article 10 adds
to the interpretation of the Treaty that would anyway have been
adopted. If this case law is correctly regarded as a result of Arti-
cle 10, it is an example of the duty not to interfere, without suffi-
cient justification, with the achievement of Community objec-
tives.7 5
K. The Duty to Carry Out Commitments Made to the Commission
When the Commission makes a recommendation to a Mem-
ber State for the amendment or abolition of a State aid scheme,
and the Member State accepts the recommendation, it becomes
binding on the State concerned, in accordance with Article 10.76
This is a specific example of a broader principle, based on
Article 10, that commitments by Member States that are in-
tended to resolve legal issues are legally binding on the State
giving them.
L. Article 10 in International Relations
Between 1990 and 2000 the Court gave several further judg-
ments in the area of international relations. In the Opinion on
75. But see Opinion of Advocate General Colomer, Procuratore della Repubblica v.
Massimiliano Placanica, Christian Palazzese & Angelo Sorrichio, Joined Cases C-338/04,
C-359/04 & C-360/04, [2007] E.C.R. 1-1891, 129-130 (suggesting that when deciding
whether to grant licenses for gambling, national authorities have a duty under the prin-
ciple of proportionality to consider what obligations are already imposed on the pro-
posed licensee by other Member States, and to impose only whatever supplementary
obligations may be required under the national law of the authority concerned); see also
United Pan-Europe Commc'n Belgium SA, Case C-250/06, slip op. 46, 48, 49 (ECJ
Dec. 13, 2007) (not yet reported) (noting that legislation imposing must-carry obliga-
tions on cable television companies, to maintain pluralism in programs, is legitimate in
the general interest, provided that it is not disproportionate and is transparent, objec-
tive and non-discriminatory); Rijksdienst voor Sociale Zekerheid v. Kiere NV, Case C-2/
05, [2006] E.C.R. 1-1079, 24 (noting that in social security for migrant workers cases,
the Member State from which the worker comes must guarantee the correctness of the
certificate it issues, and the host State is bound under Art. 10 to accept it); Idryma
Koinonikon Asfaliseon v. loannides, Case C-326/00, [2003] E.C.R. 1-1703, 40 (con-
cluding that medical benefits guaranteed under Article 31 of Reg. No. 1408/71 cannot
be deferred until the insured person returns to his State of residence).
76. See Ijssel-Vliet Combinatie BV v. Minister van Economische Zaken, Case C-311/
94, [1996] E.C.R. 1-5023, 49; see also ANTHONY M. COLLINS & CONOR QuIGLEY, EC
STATE AID LAW AND POLICY 281 (2003).
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the International Labour Organisation Convention on the Safe Use of
Chemicals, the Court held that Member States must not interfere
with exclusive Community competence or interfere with the op-
eration of Community rules.7 7 If Community participation is not
possible (for example, because the convention in question is not
open to regional economic integration organizations, but only
to States), Member States have a duty to act on behalf of the
Community, in close consultation with the Commission.
Where the subject matter of an international agreement
falls partly within Community competence and partly within
Member State competence, close cooperation between Member
States and the Community institutions is essential, because of the
"requirement of unity -.n the international representation of the
Community" in such circumstances.78
A Member State must not take any measures that would put
the Community in breach of a treaty by which the Community is
bound.79
Probably the two most important opinions of the Court in
the international sphere, during the period under discussion,
were the Opinions on the European Economic Area.8" In the first of
these opinions, the Court held that Member States, even by an
international agreement with non-Member States, must not cre-
77. See Opinion on Convention No. 170 of the International Labour Organization
Concerning Safety in the Use of Chemicals at Work, Opinion 2/91, [1993] E.C.R. I-
1061, 8.
78. Commission v. Council of the European Union, Case C-25/94, [1996] E.C.R. I-
1469, 48; see also Opinion on Competence of the Community to Conclude the New
Lugano Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judg-
ments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Opinion 1/03, [2006] E.C.R. 1-1145, 173;
Opinion on Competence of the Community or one of its institutions to participate in
the Third Revised Decision of the OECD on National Treatment, Opinion 2/92, [1995]
E.C.R. 1-521, part D, 5; Competence of the Community to Conclude International
Agreement concerning Service and the Protection of Intellectual Property, Opinion 1/
94, [1994] E.C.R. 1-5267, 108; Convention No. 170 of the International Labour Organiza-
tion, [1993] E.C.R. 1-1061, 36; Ruling on Draft Convention of the International
Atomic Energy Agency on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, Facilities and
Transports, Ruling 1/78, [1978] E.C.R. 2151, 77 34-36.
79. The Queen v. Sec'y of State for Home Dep't, Case C-324/93, [1995], E.C.R. I-
563, 32.
80. See Opinion on Draft Agreement Between the Community, on the One Hand,
and the Countries of the European Free Trade Association, on the Other, Relating to
the Creation of the European Economic Area, Opinion 1/91, [1991] E.C.R. 1-6079;
Opinion on Draft agreement between the Community, on the one hand, and the coun-
tries of the European Free Trade Association, on the other, relating to the creation of
the European Economic Area, Opinion 1/92, [1992] E.C.R. 1-2821.
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ate institutions that would interfere with the institutional bal-
ance within the Community.
If provisions of a treaty to which the Community is a party
are directly applicable, they must be applied by national courts
of Member States, even if no implementing measures have been
adopted either by the Community or by the national authori-
ties."'
Recently, in its Opinion on the new Lugano Convention on
recognition and enforcement of judgments, the Court noted
that "in all the areas corresponding to the objectives of the
Treaty, Article 10 EC requires Member States to facilitate the
achievement of the Community's tasks and to abstain from any
measure which couldjeopardise the attainment of the objectives
of the Treaty." 2
In Commission v. Netherlands, the last of a series of "open
skies" cases all decided on similar grounds, 3 the Court held that
the Netherlands had infringed Article 10 by renegotiating and
maintaining treaty commitments to the United States concern-
81. See Sevince v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, Case C-192/89, [1990] E.C.R. 1-3461,
19; ZoubirYousfi v. Belgian State, Case C-58/93, [1994] E.C.R. 1353, 9 16-19; Office
national de l'emploi v. Bahia Kziber, Case C-18/90, [1991] E.C.R. 1-199.
82. Competence of the Community to Conclude the New Lugano Convention, [2006] E.C.R.
1-1145, 119.
83. Commission v. Netherlands, Case C-523/04, [2007] E.C.R. 3267. The Court
summarized the previous "open skies" cases as follows:
The Court gave its ruling in (the open skies cases] on 5 November 2002 by
judgments in Case C-466/98 Commission v United Kingdom [2002] ECR I-
9427, Case C-467/98 Commission v Denmark [2002] ECR 1-9519, Case C-468/
98 Commission v Sweden [2002] ECR 1-9575, Case C-469/98 Commission v
Finland [2002] ECR 1-9627, Case C-471/98 Commission v Belgium [2002]
ECR 1-9681, Case C-472/98 Commission v Luxembourg [2002] ECR I 9741,
Case C 475/98 Commission v Austria [2002] ECR I 9797, and Case C 476/98
Commission v Germany [2002] ECR I 9855.
In the seven latter judgments (the action against the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland concerned a separate situation), the Court held
that, by entering into or maintaining in force, despite the renegotiation of
existing agreements, international commitments towards the United States
concerning air fares and rates charged by carriers designated by the United
States on intra-Community routes, concerning CRSs offered for use or used in
the territory of the respective defendant Member State, and by recognising the
United States as having the right to withdraw, suspend or limit traffic rights in
cases where air carriers designated by the defendant Member State were not
owned by the latter or its nationals, the defendant Member States had failed to
fulfil their obligations under Articles 5 and 52 of the Treaty and under Regula-
tions Nos. 2409/92 and 2299/89, as amended by Regulation No 3089/93.
Id. 99 15-16.
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ing air fares charged by U.S. carriers on intra-Community routes,
computerized reservation systems used in the Netherlands, and
giving the United States the right to alter traffic rights if carriers
designated by the Netherlands cease to be owned by Dutch na-
tionals. After quoting Article 10, the Court said, "[i]n the area
of external relations, the Court has held that the Community's
tasks and the objectives of the EC Treaty would be compromised
if Member States were able to enter into international commit-
ments containing provisions capable of affecting rules adopted
by the Community or of altering their scope."84
This principle is not, of course, limited to transport cases. It
goes back to Opinion 1/76 and the AETR judgment in 1971,
referred to above.
M. The Duties of the Commission to the Member States
In a variety of situations, the Court has said that the Com-
mission has a legal duty to Member State authorities to provide
information to them, to enable the national authorities to fulfil
their duties under Community law.
So, for example, the Commission has a legal duty to provide
information to national courts dealing with possible breaches of
Community law.85 This is particularly important in the sphere of
Community competition law."6 But the Commission also has a
duty to tell national authorities, for example, the time limits for
applications for the approval by the Commission of agricultural
premiums.87
N. The Duties of the Community Institutions to One Another
The Court again had to deal with cases involving contro-
versy about where sessions of the European Parliament should
be held, which involved both the powers of the Parliament to
ensure the proper conduct of its own proceedings, and its duty
to "have regard to" the powers of the Member States to decide
84. Id. 75.
85. See Tillack v. Commission, Case T-193/04, [2006] E.C.R. 11-3995, 72; Nether-
lands v. Zwartfeld, Case C-2/88, [1990] E.C.R. 1-3365, 22.
86. See Masterfoods Ltd. v. HB Ice Cream Ltd., Case C-344/98, [2000] E.C.R. I-
11369, 23; Delimitis v. Henninger BrduCase, C-234/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-935, 53; see
also Council Regulation No. 1/2003, art. 15, O.J. L 1/1 (2003) (on the implementation
of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty).
87. See Italy v. Commission, Case C-10/88, [1990] E.C.R. 1-1229.
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the seat of the institutions.88 The Court said Article 10 imposed
"mutual duties."89
III. THE ASSESSMENT OF THE CASE LAW ON ARTICLE 10
A. The FMDE Congress, Helsinki, 2000
It is convenient to use the year 2000 as a basis for dividing
the periods identified in this Article because in that year the F6d-
6ration Internationale pour le droit Europ6en ("FIDE") in Hel-
sinki had a broad discussion of the legal duties under Article
10.90 In accordance with normal FIDE procedure, there were
88. See, e.g., Parliament v. Council, Case C-392/95, [1997] E.C.R. 1-3213; Parlia-
ment v. Council, Case C-65/93, [1995] E.C.R. 1-643; Luxembourg v. Parliament, Case C-
213/88, [1991] E.C.R. 1-5643, 5692; European Parliament v. Council of the European
Communities, Case C-70/88, [1990] E.C.R. 1-2041.
89. Parliament, [1995] E.C.R. 1-643, 1 23.
90. See 1 John Temple Lang, General Report: The duties of cooperation of national au-
thorities and courts and the Community Institutions under Article 10 EC, in XIX F.I.D.E. CON-
GRESS 373-426 (Sundstr6m & Kauppi eds., 2000) [hereinafter FIDE GENERAL REPORT];
see also PJ.G. KAPTrEYN & P. VERLOREN vAN THEMAAT, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES: FROM MAASTRICHT TO AMSTERDAM 148-63 (Laurence W. Gor-
mley ed., 3rd ed. 1998). By the time of the Helsinki Congress, there was a substantial
body of published comment of Article 10. See generally MARC BLANQUET, L'ARTICLE 5 DU
TRArrk CEE: RECHERCHE SUR LES OBLIGATIONS DE FIDtLIT9 DES ETATS MEMBRES DE LA
COMMUNAUTt (1994); Durand, Chapitre II: Le principe de cooperation loyale entre les etats
membres et les institutions, in I COMMENTAIRE MtGRET: LE DROIT DE LA CEE 25-43 (2d ed.
1992); Ole Due, Article 5 du trait( CEE-une disposition de caract&re f~dfrale?, Con-
f6rence Robert Schuman sur le droit communautaire (Florence, 1991); Laurence W.
Gormley, The Development of General Principles of Law Within Article 10 (ex Article 5) EC, in
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 113, 113-18 (Ulf Bernitz &Joakim
Nergelius eds., 2000);John Temple Lang, The Principle of Loyal Cooperation and the Role of
the National Judge in Community, Union and EEA Law, 4 ERA-FORUM 476, 476-501 (2006);
John Temple Lang, Developments, Issues and New Remedies: The Duties of National Authori-
ties and Courts Under Article 10 of the EC Treaty, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1904, 1904-39
(2004); John Temple Lang, The Duties of Cooperation of National Authorities and Courts
Under Article IOE.C.: Two More Reflections, 26 EUR. L. REv. 84, 84-93 (2001);John Tem-
ple Lang, The Duties of National Authorities Under Community Constitutional Law, 23 EUR. L.
REv. 109, 109-31 (1998); John Temple Lang, The Duties of National Courts Under
Community Constitutional Law, 22 EUR. L. REv. 3, 3-18 (1997); John Temple Lang, The
Core of the Constitutional Law of the Community - Article 5 EC, in CURRENT AND FUTURE
PERSPECTIVES ON EC COMPETITION LAw 41, 51-68 (Laurence W. Gormley ed., 1997);
John Temple Lang, Community Constitutional Law, supra note 28, at 645-82; John Temple
Lang, Article 5 of the EEC Treaty: The Emergence of Constitutional Principles in the Case Law of
the Court of Justice, 10 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 503-537 (1987); KOEN LENAERTS & PIET VAN
NUFFEL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 115-23 (Robert Bray ed., 2d.
ed., 2005); Koen Lenaerts, Le Devoir de Lcyauti Communautaire, in LA LOYAUT: Mt-
LANGE OFFERT A ETIENNE CEREXHE 229, 229-47 (Joe Verhoeven ed., 1997); HENRY G.
SCHERMERS & DENIS F. WAELBROECK, JUDICIAL PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 112-
15, 300 (6th ed. 2001); Van Raepenbusch, Le devoir de lo'yauti dans l'ordrejuridique com-
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national reports from all of the then Member States, a Commu-
nity report by former Advocate General van Gerven, a report on
the European Free Trade Association ("EFTA"), a national re-
port from Switzerland and a general report. This was the largest
conference ever to discuss Article 10. The conclusions, or at
least the General Rapporteur's impressions of the conclusions
reached, are set out in Volume IV of the conference proceed-
ings.9 1
One of the most important results of the FIDE conference
was a list of the limits of Article 10. This list (set out below) said
little that was new, but it was useful to put Article 10 duties into
proportion, and to show that they do not represent a serious en-
croachment on national authorities' powers. At the same time
the conference brought Article 10 to the attention of many law-
yers, and in particular called their attention to the very large
number of cases in which, by 2000, the Court had cited or relied
on Article 10.
The FIDE conference did not try to agree on any compre-
hensive paraphrase or explanation of Article 10 which would be
helpful in all cases to courts responsible for interpreting it. It
had been suggested that "all national authorities, judicial and
non-judicial, have a duty to take whatever action is necessary to
make the Community legal system work effectively in the way
that it is objectively intended to work, and a corresponding duty
to avoid any action which would interfere with this working."
9 2
There was some questioning of the importance of Article
10, essentially on the basis that some of the consequences which
the Court had drawn from Article 10 could probably have been
arrived at on other grounds. That is probably correct. Article 10
did not bring into Community law a large body of rules which
would not otherwise have been there. But the fact remains that
Article 10 is in the Treaty, and that it has been cited and relied
on by the Court in a great many cases that have progressively
established principles concerning the many and varied relation-
ships between national authorities and the Community institu-
munautaire, DROIT SOCIAL, No. 11, November 1999, at 908-915; see also Monica Claes,
THE NATIONAL COURTS' MANDATE IN THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION 58-68 (2006); Daniel
Halberstam, Of Power and Responsibility: The Political Morality of Federal Systems, 90 VA. L.
REv. 731, 781-82 (2004).
91. See FIDE GENERAL REPORT, supra note 90.
92. Id. at 376.
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tions. These principles can fairly be described as constitutional.
They had to be developed by the Court in its case law, both be-
cause the Community Treaties were not drafted as a constitution
(they did not say many things that a constitution ought to say)
and because the legal system or legal order set up by the Treaties
was unique and unprecedented, and gave rise to many legal
questions which had never previously arisen. In some cases no
doubt the answers were fairly clear, and would have been
reached without Article 10. In other cases the answers, even
those which seem clear now, were certainly not obvious, and
were highly controversial. Some of the Court's judgments that
are based on Article 10 were criticized, wrongly, as 'judicial activ-
ism,""3 largely because the Court had not consistently referred to
Article 10 even when its judgments were in fact based on that
Article. In many cases, the answers given by the Court, even
when clearly correct, had simply not been anticipated.
Another reason why Article 10 was important, which can
perhaps be seen more clearly now than in 2000, is that it states a
principle that is equally applicable to both "dualist" States
(which regard international law as quite separate from national
law) and "monist" States (which accept more readily the idea
that treaty obligations, once accepted and ratified, become part
of national law even without implementing legislation). As al-
ready mentioned, once the Court had accepted the principle of
direct application of Community law94 and the principle of pri-
macy of Community law over national law,95 the inevitable conse-
quence was that national courts, in a legal system in which al-
most all powers are concurrent, would become the allies of the
Court of Justice in ensuring that in the application of the Trea-
ties, the law is observed. A Treaty Article on the lines of Article
10 was therefore important to indicate to national courts what
they were progressively asked to do.
At a more recent international conference on Article 10, or-
ganized by the Academy of European Law of Trier, a large num-
ber of national judges discussed Article 10 at length, without any
significant dissent from the principles based on it by the case
93. Id. at 411-12.
94. See NV Algemene Transport-en Expedite Onderneming van Gend & Loos v.
Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration, Case 26/62, [1963] E.C.R. 1, part B.
95. See Flaminio Costa v. ENEL, Case 6/64, [1964] E.C.R. 585.
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law. 96
It may be said that if the conclusion reached by the Court is
correct, the question whether Article 10 is the legal basis for it is
unimportant. That may be true in any specific case, but it is rele-
vant to know when Article 10 is being applied, so as to see
whether a proposed conclusion is correct, and so that when
other similar cases arise, the courts dealing with them know
whether Article 10 is applicable or not.
B. The FIDE Congress Conclusions-The Limits of Article 10
The limits of Article 10 concern the scope of the Article's
effects, its substantive consequences, and its procedural aspects.
They were summarized for the FIDE Congress in substantially
the following way.
97
Article 10 by itself never creates duties, but only together
with some other rule of Community law, or some principle or
objective of Community policy which is to be facilitated or, at
least, not jeopardized. Legal consequences cannot be deduced
from the general words of Article 10 alone, but only in combina-
tion with other specific rules. The content of the obligation re-
sults from the other rule or objective.
Article 10 does not create any wholly new duties, not related
to those which are already binding on Member States or to
which they have agreed as Community objectives or policies. A
Member State cannot have a duty under Article 10 to which it
has neither agreed in principle (by agreeing to the measure, pol-
icy or objective which Article 10 obliges it not to frustrate) or
become bound through majority voting or under the Treaties
themselves.
Article 10 applies only in the absence of a lex specialis. Arti-
cle 10 applies only in combination with some other rule or pol-
icy which is not complete and sufficient in itself. It is a general,
residual, supplementary provision.98 But if the other rule is com-
prehensive enough, there is no need to rely on Article 10.
96. See generally Access to Justice in Community Law, 4 ERA FORUM (2006).
97. John Temple Lang, The Duties of Cooperation of National Authorities, supra note
90, at 84-93.
98. See, e.g., Commission v. Portugal, Case C-84/04, [2006] E.C.R. 1-9843, 40;
Commission v. Denmark, Case C-392/02, [2005] E.C.R. 1-9811, 69; Commission v.
Denmark, Case C-464/02, [2005] E.C.R. 1-7929, 1 84; see also Union frangaise de
1'express (UFEX) v. Commission, Case T-60/05 (ECJ Sept. 12, 2007) (not yet reported).
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Article 10 is not an exception to the principle that duties are
imposed on private parties only by or on the basis of Community
or national legislation (or of the Treaties themselves). The duty
of private parties not to interfere with the freedoms of others
given by Community law, and the duty of national authorities to
ensure that private parties do not interfere with the freedoms of
others under Community law,99 both result from the Treaty it-
self.
Article 10 cannot be used by a national court unless the
Community rule or objective is clear enough to be a basis for
precise, justiciable obligations.100 It is not a device for filling in
or developing the content of a policy which has not been agreed
in detail, and which needs to be dealt with by general Commu-
nity measures.
Article 10 does not say which national authority should be
responsible for achieving the result, or what its procedures
should be, provided that the result is achieved or avoided. Mem-
ber States are free to use a wide variety of different procedures
to achieve the result required by Community law.10 1
The legal consequences of Article 10 depend on the rule of
Community law with which it is combined. Article 10 always has
direct effects when the other rule of Community law is directly
applicable. If the other rule is not directly applicable, Article 10
may create some direct effects, for example, Van Munster'°2 and
the Moorman10 3 principles, but does not necessarily do so. The
consequences of Article 10 for the inter-institutional relations of
the Community, or in the area of international relations, are un-
likely to include direct effects in national courts.
The Commission has no power under Article 10 to adopt
99. See Schmidberger v. Austria, Case C-112/00, [2003] E.C.R. 1-5659, 1 31-34;
Commission v. France, Case C-265/95, [1997] E.C.R. 1-6959, 11 52, 53, 86.
100. See Association des Centres Distributeurs Edouard Leclerc v. SARL "Au ble
vert," Case 229/83, [1985] E.C.R. 1, 11 1-30; Cava v. Regione Lombardia, Case C-236/
92, [1994] E.C.R. 1-483, 11 1-16.
101. See Unibet Ltd. v. Justitiekanslern, Case C-432/05, [2007] E.C.R. 1-2271, 1 38;
Cooperativa LattepiQ arl v. AIMA, Joined Cases C-231, C-303 & C-451/00, [2004] E.C.R.
1-2869, 11 56-57.
102. Simon J.M. van Munster v. Rijksdienst voor Pensioenen, Case C-165/91,
[1994] E.C.R. 1-4661, 1 20; see also Thieffry v. Conseil de l'ordre des Avocats de Paris,
Case 71/76, [1977] E.C.R. 765, 1 16.
103. Oberkreisdirektor des Kreises v. Handelsonderneming Moorman BV, Case
190/87, [1988] E.C.R. 4689, It 21-24.
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measures which are themselves legally binding, even to give ef-
fect and practical detail to already existing obligations, or to cre-
ate new legal obligations. The Commission's only means of en-
forcing Article 10 is to bring proceedings under Article 226 (ex-
169). Article 10 is not the equivalent of Article 86(3) EC. Nor
has the Commission any power to relieve Member States of their
duties under Community law, at least insofar as private rights
might be affected.
Article 10 is not a justification for making Community law
rules broader, by analogy, than the relevant rules themselves. So
Article 10 cannot be grounds for saying that a State measure re-
quiring private companies to buy electricity from renewable en-
ergy sources, at minimum prices and at the buyers' expense, is
contrary to State aid rules.10 4 Similarly, price control legislation
cannot be objected to merely on the grounds that it has the
same effect as an illegal price-fixing agreement between compa-
nies.' °5 Where tax powers have been given to local or regional
authorities, a low tax rate imposed by one authority cannot be
considered a State aid merely because a similar effect might have
been caused by national legislation. 0 6 However, Article 10 does
oblige national courts to prevent companies achieving by indi-
rect means results that they would not legally achieve directly."0 7
In short, Article 10 is not a legal basis for making justiciable
every weakness or filling every gap in the national application of
Community rules. This is important, because in the area of Po-
lice and Judicial Cooperation there will be many such gaps.
104. See PreussenElektra AG v. Schhleswag AG, Case C-379/98, [2001] E.C.R. I-
2099, 1 58.
105. See Wolf W. Meng, Case C-2/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-5751, 11 14, 19; Ohra Schad-
everzekeringen NV, Case C-245/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-5851, 1 12; Bundesanstalt fur den
Gueterfernverkehr v. Gebrueder Reiff GmbH & Co. KG, Case C-185/91, [1993] E.C.R.
1-5801, 1 14. Legislation is, of course, democratically adopted, but price fixing agree-
ments between companies are not. See Harm Schepel, Delegation of Regulatory Powers to
Private Parties under EC Competition Law: Towards a Procedural Public Interest Test, 39 CoM-
MION MKT. L. REv. 31, 33, 46 (2002).
106. See Portugal v. Commission, Case C-88/03, [2006] E.C.R. 1-7115, 11 3, 5; see
also Herrera v. Servicio Cantabro de Salud, Case C-466/04, [2006] E.C.R. 1-5341, 11 44-
45; Staat der Nederlanden v. Ten Kate Holding Musselkanaal BV, Case C-511/03,
[2005] E.C.R. 1-8979, 11 28, 31; EU Wood-Trading GmbH v. Sonderabfall, Case C-277/
02, [2004] E.C.R. 1-11957, 1 48.
107. See Etablissements Consten S.a.R.L. & Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. Commis-
sion, Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, [1966] E.C.R. 299, 11 5, 6, 10; see also Coote v. Granada
Hospitality Ltd., Case C-185/97, [1998] E.C.R. 1-5199, 11 17-20.
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Two other limitations should also be mentioned. In some
of the most difficult cases, merely knowing that the principle is
based on Article 10 may not help much in applying it. Also, Arti-
cle 10 does not necessarily provide solutions to all the problems
that arise if one or more Member States, even by agreement,
does not take part in an arrangement for closer cooperation be-
tween most or all of the other Member States.1 0 8
These limits are important, because if they are understood
they should help to dispel some nationalist prejudices against
Community law.
IV. DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1990
A. The Constitutional Treaty and the Treaty of Lisbon
One striking development since 2000 was the adoption of
the draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, which
contained two Articles replacing Article 10.109 Although it never
came into force, its provisions are still of interest. Article 5(2)
dealt with the relations between the European Union and Mem-
ber States, and said:
[F]ollowing the principle of loyal cooperation, the Union
and the Member States shall, in full mutual respect, assist
each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Constitu-
tion. The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of
the Union's tasks and refrain from any measure which could
jeopardise the attainment of the objectives set out in the Con-
stitution. 110
Article 10 of the draft Constitution dealt with Union law. It
said:
1. The Constitution, and law adopted by the Union's Institu-
tions in exercising competences conferred on it, shall have
primacy over the law of the Member States.
2. Member States shall take all appropriate measures, general
or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations flowing
from the Constitution or resulting from the Union Institu-
108. See, e.g., United Kingdom v. Council of the European Union, Joined Cases C-
77 & C-137/05, slip op. (ECJ Dec. 18, 2007) (not yet reported).
109. Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, Dec. 16, 2004, O.J. C
310/1 (2004) (not ratified) [hereinafter Draft Treaty].
110. Id. art. 5(3), at 7.
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tions' acts.11 1
These two Articles substantially repeat the existing words of
Article 10, and confirm that Member States did not wish to limit
its scope or effects. 112 This was the first time that any proposal
had been made to add to or clarify Article 10. The new Articles
would have made explicit for the first time the reciprocal nature
of the obligations which result, for Member States and EU Insti-
tutions, from the duty of "loyal cooperation." These draft Arti-
cles would explicitly extend the principles of Article 10 into the
area of Common Foreign and Security Policy and the area of
Police and Judicial Cooperation in criminal matters, two wholly
new spheres. This aspect of the draft Article has been controver-
sial.
The draft Article 10 is right to link the principle of primacy
(never previously stated in the Treaty) of Community law with
the duty to ensure fulfilment of Community obligations. The
duty to give "full effect" results from the principle of primacy,
and draws out its implications.
In theory it was no doubt correct to distinguish between ef-
fects on relations between the EU and the Member States, and
effect on EU law. But it is not clear that this separation would
have had any important effects in practice in the Community law
sphere (the First Pillar). By distinguishing two kinds of effects of
what is now Article 10, the new Treaty would have called atten-
tion to them, and this in itself might have led to further conse-
quences.
Article 3a(3) of the Treaty of Lisbon provides that:
Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union
and the Member States shall, in full mutual respect, assist
each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties.
The Member States shall take any appropriate measure,
general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations
arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the
institutions of the Union.
The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of
111. Id. art. 10, at 10.
112. In Protocol 30 to the EC Treaty, on subsidiarity and proportionality, the
Member States specifically said that Article 10 binds Member States when the sub-
sidiarity principle leads to no action being taken by the Community. This Protocol
seems to apply whenever there is a Community policy but no Community legislation. See
EC Treaty, supra note 1, Protocol 30.
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the Union's tasks and refrain from any measure which could
jeopardise the attainment of the Union's objectives.' 13
As in the case of the corresponding provision of the abor-
tive Constitutional Treaty, the significance of this is to extend
into the areas of Common Foreign and Security Policy and of
Police and Judicial Cooperation the legal principles developed
by the Court of Justice under Article 10.
B. Member State Liability for Constitutionally Independent Courts
In Commission v. Italy the Court held that, to determine
whether national legislation correctly implements Community
law, it is necessary to look at the judgments of the national
courts, even though they are constitutionally independent.114
Isolated judgments, especially if contrary to national Supreme
Court judgments, can be ignored. But a widely held interpreta-
tion, confirmed by the Supreme Court, must be taken into ac-
count. So the State is in breach of its obligations if it maintains
in force legislation that is interpreted by its courts in such a way
that a taxpayers' claims, under Community law, to repayment of
taxes are made excessively difficult. In the same year the Court
held that a Member State was in breach of its obligations when
its Supreme Court infringed Community law, and would have to
pay damages. 15
C. The Pupino Judgment
The Court of Justice, without waiting for the draft Constitu-
tion, but almost certainly encouraged by it, decided that the
principle of loyal cooperation is binding in the area of police
and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (the Third Pillar).
This was decided, in general terms, though in a specific context,
in Pupino in 2005.116 That case concerned the interpretation of
113. Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
establishing the European Community art. 3a(3), Dec. 17, 2007, 0.J. C 306/10, at 12
(2007) [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon].
114. See Commission v. Italy, Case C-129/00, [2003] E.C.R. 1-14637, 30-32. In
particular, this was the result of a mere presumption that indirect taxes are passed on,
and therefore could not be reclaimed. A rule that failure to produce accounts and a
rule that failure in the company's accounts to treat the refund claim as an improper
payment and as an asset in the balance sheet led to the presumption.
115. See K6bler v. Austria, Case C-224/01, [2003] E.C.R. 1-10239, 1 126-27.
116. Pupino, Case C-105/03, [2005] E.C.R 1-5285; see also United Kingdom v.
Council of the European Union, Case C-137/05, slip op., 1 50, 55, 59 (ECJ Dec. 18,
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a Framework Decision on the standing of victims in criminal pro-
ceedings. The Framework Decision had been adopted by the
Council in the context of Title VI of the EU Treaty, on police
and judicial cooperation. The Framework Decision was one of
the kinds of measures on the interpretation of which the Court
has power to give a preliminary ruling. The question was
whether the Framework Decision could have direct effect, or
should be interpreted as purely inter-governmental. The Court
said that because Framework Decisions are binding, they place
on national authorities, and particularly national courts, an obli-
gation to interpret national law in conformity with the Decisions.
The jurisdiction to give rulings on the interpretation of Deci-
sions would be meaningless if individuals were not entitled to
invoke Framework Decisions in national courts. The Court said:
It would be difficult for the Union to carry out its task effec-
tively if the principle of loyal cooperation, requiring in partic-
ular that Member States take all appropriate measures,
whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of their
obligations under European Union law, were not also bind-
ing in the area of police and judicial cooperation in criminal
matters .... When applying national law, the national court
that is called on to interpret [Title VI] must do so as far as
possible in the light of the wording and purpose of the frame-
work decision.11 7
In effect, the Court said that the Marleasingi ts principle in
2007) (not yet reported) (interpreting the Schengen Protocol, and the system of closer
cooperation when one Member State is not participating on the same basis as the
others); Organisation des Modjahedines du Peuple D'Iran v. Council of the European
Union, Case T-228/02, [2006] E.C.R. 11-4665, 122-23 (holding that Article 10 "is
especially binding in the area of JHA governed by Title VI of the EU Treaty, which is
moreover entirely based on cooperation between the Member States and the institu-
tions"); Calfa, Case C-348/96, [1999] E.C.R. 1-11, 1 17 (holding that state legislation
may not restrict the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by Community law); Sacha
Prechal, Domestic Legal Effects on EU Criminal Law: Variations on Three Themes, in INTER-
FACE BETWEEN EU LAW AND NATIONAL LAW 335, 344-45 (L. Lavranos & D. Obradovic
eds., 2007) (pointing out that the German Constitutional Court and the Polish Consti-
tutional Tribunal in the European arrest warrant cases seem to disagree with the Pupino
judgment, but that the Czech Constitutional Court, referring explicitly to Article 10 EC,
interpreted the arrest warrant legislation to be consistent with European legal princi-
ples); Jolande Prinssen, Domestic Legal Effects of EU Criminal Law: A Transfer of EC Law
Doctrines?, in INTERFACE BETWEEN EU LAW AND NATIONAL LAW, supra, at 318, 318-26.
117. Pupino, [2005] E.C.R. 1-5285, 1 42-43.
118. Marleasing v. La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion, Case C-106/89,
[1990] E.C.R. 1-4135, 1 8 (holding that "the national court called upon to interpret
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particular, and the principles stated in Article 10 in general, al-
ready apply in the Third Pillar sphere, the sphere of police and
judicial cooperation.
Article 10 is potentially very important in the sphere of po-
lice and judicial cooperation, the Third Pillar sphere, especially
as the relevant Treaty Articles are badly drafted. One would ex-
pect, for example, that the duty of national courts under Article
10 to raise questions of Community or EU law on their own initi-
ative would be particularly important in these cases, particularly
when the question raised issues of fundamental rights.119 One
would also expect that the duty of national courts to give "effec-
tive" protection in practice to rights given or guaranteed by Eu-
ropean law would lead to important judgments in this sphere. If
a national court had ordered the release of an accused person, it
might have a duty under Article 10 to ensure that he was not
immediately re-arrested on other grounds. When the Court of
Justice has given a judgment in response to a question from a
national court, other national courts would be bound by the
judgment even if they had no power, under national law, to ask
the Court questions. Indeed, Article 10 is likely to be particu-
larly important because the provisions on police and judicial co-
operation are not as effective as Article 234 to ensure uniform
interpretation and application of European law rules. One
would expect that there is a duty under Article 10 to limit forum
shopping by prosecuting authorities. If national courts differ on
an important issue, a court that has power to do so may have a
duty under Article 10 to refer the issue to the Court of Justice.
D. Article 10 When a Member State Has "Opted Out"
Two cases were brought by the United Kingdom to chal-
lenge Regulations on standards for security features in passports
issued by Member States and setting up an agency for coopera-
tion at the external borders of the Community. The challenge
arose because the Schengen Protocol, made Community law by
the Treaty of Amsterdam, did not apply to the United Kingdom,
and the Title IV Protocol on the position of the United Kingdom
[national law] is required to do so, as far as possible, in the light of the working and the
purpose of the directive").
119. See, e.g., Miraglia, Case C-469/03, [2005] E.C.R. 1-2009, 28 (ne bis in idem
principle); Commission v. Council, Case C-257/01, [2005] E.C.R. 1-345, 59 (duty to
give reasons for measures).
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and Ireland said that no measure pursuant to that Title would be
binding on the United Kingdom. However, proposals to build
upon the Schengen acquis are subject to the normal Treaty pro-
visions, and the United Kingdom and Ireland are free to declare
that they wish to take part in the areas of cooperation in ques-
tion. Taking part would give them the right to veto.
The Advocate General considered that the United Kingdom
cannot take part in the arrangements to cooperate unless the
proposed development of the Schengen Protocol can exist au-
tonomously, that is, separate from and not dependent on the
Schengen arrangements in which the United Kingdom is not
participating. The United Kingdom is not entitled to obtain the
benefits of participating in part of the arrangements if it is not
bearing the burdens of participation in other related parts. The
Council had argued that Article 10 was not enough to protect
the integrity of the arrangements already made under
Schengen 1 2 ° This is probably correct: it would be difficult if
not impossible to use Article 10 to determine when or how a
Member State should vote in the Council. The Court decided
that the clause in the Schengen Protocol applies only to propos-
als to build on the Schengen acquis which the United Kingdom
has been authorized to take part in.121
E. The Competition Law Decentralization Regulation
Another important development was Regulation 1/2003,
the Community competition law decentralization regulation. It
envisages close cooperation between national competition au-
thorities, and makes explicit the duties, which already resulted
from Article 10, of national courts to avoid adopting judgments
inconsistent with Commission decisions. This cooperation raises
a number of issues under Article 10, and has done so in the Innt-
repreneur case.
122
120. Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak, United Kingdom v. Council, Case C-
77/05, slip op., 107-08 (ECJ Dec. 18, 2007) (not yet reported); Opinion of Advocate
General Trstenjak, United Kingdom v. Council, Case C-137/05, slip op., 1 97,105, 110
(ECJ Dec. 18, 2007) (not yet reported).
121. United Kingdom v. Council, Case C-77/05, slip op., 68 (ECJ Dec. 18, 2007)
(not yet reported); United Kingdom v. Council, Case C-1 37/05, slip op., 50 (ECJ Dec.
18, 2007) (not yet reported).
122. Inntrepreneur Pub. Co. v. Crehan [2006] UKHL 38, [2007] 1 A.C. 333 (appeal
taken from Eng.) (U.K.); see John Temple Lang, Inntrepreneur and the Duties of National
Courts underArticle IOEC, 5 COMPETITION LJ. 231, 231-35 (2006); see alsoJohn D. Cooke,
152520081
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The Court has also confirmed that national courts have a
duty under Article 10 to award compensation for breach of Com-
munity competition law. 123 Also, although the judgment in Ro-
quetteFrfres was given before Regulation 1/2003 came into force,
it illustrates how far the Court insists on the duty of national
courts under Article 10 to coordinate the exercise of its powers
with those of the Commission.1 24 If the national court considers
that the Commission has not given it enough information to jus-
tify help with a surprise inspection, it cannot simply dismiss the
request for help, but must ask the Commission for further infor-
mation.
F. Some Specific Judgments Since 2001
Article 10 is still developing. Disregarding cases in which
principles based on Article 10 were applied or referred to with-
out mentioning the Article itself, there were fifty-seven citations
of the Article in judgments or Advocate Generals' conclusions in
2006, and approximately twenty-seven in 2007. As already men-
tioned, Article 10 is relied on most often when a new legal issue
or a new situation arises, where there is little or no relevant case
law, and arguments are being based on general principles.
One such case was the Sellafield nuclear reactor case, which
was brought by the Commission and is one of the relatively few
cases initiated by the Commission primarily on the basis of Arti-
cle 10.125 The Commission argued that it was contrary to Article
10 for Ireland to have referred a dispute with the United King-
dom over the Sellafield nuclear reactor to arbitration under the
United Nations Law of the Sea Convention, without first inform-
ing and consulting the Commission, and instead of using Article
General Report, in FIDE 2004 NATIONAL REPORTS, THE MODERNIZATION OF EU COMPETI-
TION LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 630, 636-52 (Dermot Cahill ed.,
2004);JOHN TEMPLE LANG, FIDE CONGRESS 1998, GENERAL REPORT ON THE APPLICATION
OF COMMUNITY COMPETITION LAW ON ENTERPRISES BY NATIONAL COURTS AND NATIONAL
AUTHORITIES (1998), available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/compeition/speeches/
text/sp1998j027en.pdf.
123. See Manfredi, Case C-295/04, [2006] E.C.R. 1-6619, 60; Crehan v. Courage,
Case C-453/99, [2001] ECR 1-6297, 25.
124. See Roquette Frires v. Directeur general de la concurrence, Case C-94/00,
[2002] E.C.R. 1-9011, 1 90; see also France T614com v. Commission, Case T-339/04, slip
op., 1 47 (ECJ Mar. 8, 2007) (not yet reported).
125. Commission v. Ireland, Case C-459/03, [2006] E.C.R. 1-4635 [hereinafter Sel-
lafield Nuclear Reactor].
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292 EC. The Court agreed that Ireland was in breach of both
Article 10 and Article 292.126 The Court considered the two arti-
cles separately. 12
7
In a case brought against Germany for ratifying and imple-
menting bilateral agreements on transport with (then) non-
Member States without cooperating or consulting with the Com-
mission, when Community legislation had been adopted, Article
10 was relied on, and the infringement of Article 10 was the only
infringement upheld by the Court.128 Once the Commission has
been authorized to negotiate a multilateral international agree-
ment on behalf of the Community, Member States have a duty of
close cooperation to ensure consistency of action.
In a case in which the Commission had adopted a decision
ordering France to recover illegally paid State aid, the Court
found that France had infringed its duty under Article 10 by con-
tinuously disputing the amount to be recovered, instead of carry-
ing out the decision. 129 Interestingly, the Court made this find-
ing in addition to the ruling that France had infringed the deci-
sion itself.
G. Private Litigation
The Laboratoires Boiron judgment concerned the duty of na-
tional courts to order disclosure of evidence in private litiga-
tion. ° This is a potentially important and interesting example
of the effectiveness principle."' A pharmaceutical laboratory ar-
gued that it should not have to pay a social security contribution
because wholesale distributors with which it was competing were
exempt from the same contributions. The laboratory argued
that this exemption constituted State aid to the wholesalers, be-
cause the advantage exceeded the wholesalers' costs of their
public service obligations. The Court said that the laboratory
could recover the proportion of what it had paid to the State
126. See id. 1 123-33, 172; see also Commission v. Italy, C-35/96, [1998] E.C.R. I-
3851, 1 53; Commission v. France, Case 7/71, [1971] E.C.R. 1003, 47-48.
127. See Sellafield Nuclear Reactor, [2006] E.C.R. 1-4635, 1 171.
128. See Commission v. Germany, Case C-433/03, [2005] E.C.R. 1-6985, 1 60-73;
Commission v. Luxembourg, Case C-266/03, [2005] E.C.R. 1-4805, 41.
129. See ommission v. France, Case C-441/06, slip op., 1 26 (ECJ Oct. 18, 2007)
(not yet reported).





which corresponded to the advantage unlawfully obtained by the
wholesalers. However, the laboratory had not got the necessary
information about the wholesalers' costs, and the wholesalers
were not parties to the proceedings between Boiron and the
State. The Court held that, to comply with the effectiveness
principle, "the national court is required to use all procedures
available to it under national law, including that of ordering the
necessary measures of inquiry, in particular the production by
one of the parties or a third party" of documents, if otherwise it
would be impossible or excessively difficult for the evidence to
be produced by the claimant.13 2
This judgment shows that the effectiveness principle may
oblige national courts to obtain evidence needed by a claimant
to make a claim under Community law, if the claim would other-
wise be excessively difficult for the claimant to prove. This judg-
ment is obviously relevant to claims by private companies for dis-
crimination or for infringement of Community competition
rules, in which often only the defendant has the information
needed to prove the case.
This judgment is likely to be particularly important for
claimants in Member States without a developed practice of dis-
closure or discovery in litigation, since the judgment should help
to solve one of the problems that have made it difficult to bring
private claims for discrimination, or for breach of Community
competition law.
In Muioz & Superior Fruiticola v. Frumar Ltd., the Court de-
cided that Community Regulations on quality standards for
products could be enforced by a competitor by civil proceedings
for an injunction."' National law must allow this, to ensure the
"full effectiveness" of the Regulation. The claimant has an inter-
est in compliance with the Regulation by all of its rivals, and non-
compliance is an unlawful act adversely affecting the claimant.
This judgment implies that Community measures that appear to
be primarily intended to protect the general interest or the in-
terests of consumers may also protect the private rights of com-
petitors. The right of rivals to sue for injunctions is not limited
132. Id. 57.
133. Mufioz & Superior Fruiticola v. Frumar Ltd., Case C-253/00, [2002] E.C.R. I-
7289, 30; Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed, Mufioz & Superior Fruiticola v.
Frumar Ltd., Case C-253/00, [2002] E.C.R. 1-7289, 63.
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to breaches of competition law, and applies even when the non-
compliance causes loss to the claimant only indirectly.'
H. The Duty of National Administrative Authorities to Set Aside
National Legislation Inconsistent With Community Law
An even more important judgment was given by the Court a
year later, in Fiammiferi v. Autorita Garante.'35 The Court decided
that when a national competition authority is applying Commu-
nity competition law, it must disregard national legislation order-
ing or encouraging conduct that is contrary to Community
rules.1"6 The duty to disregard national legislation inconsistent
with Community law applies to non-judicial authorities as well as
national courts.'3 7 This judgment is important because it en-
ables national competition authorities to challenge and nullify
the effects of anticompetitive national legislation insofar as it
leads to breaches of Community competition law.
I. The Court's Increasing Concern With the Effectiveness of
National Procedures
As already mentioned, the need to determine whether na-
tional court procedures provide "effective" protection for Com-
munity law rights and effective enforcement of Community law
duties is increasingly involving the Court in assessing how na-
tional procedures work in practice. There have been several
cases concerned with the duty of national courts to re-consider
cases wrongly decided if they are not final decisions.1"' The
need to consider how national rules work in practice is illus-
trated in Roquette Frres, Unibet, and Commission v. Italy."3 9 This
134. See Crehan v. Courage, Case C-453/99, [2001] E.C.R. 1-6297; Manfredi v. Ad-
riatico Assicurazioni SpA, Cannito v. Fondiaria Sai SpA & Tricarico & Murgolo v. As-
sitalia SpA., Joined Cases C-295-298/04, [2006] E.C.R. 1-6619, 7.
135. Case C,-198/01, [2003] E.C.R. 1-8055.
136. See id. 58.
137. See Fratelli Costanzo SpA v. Comune di Milano, Case 103/88, [1989] E.C.R
1839, 33.
138. See, e.g., Kapferer v. Schlank & Schick GmbH, Case C,-234/04, [2006] E.C.R I-
2585, 20-24 (holding that principle of cooperation does not require national court
to disapply internal rules of procedure in order to review and set aside final judicial
decision if that decision is contrary to Community law); Kfihne & Heitz NV v. Product-
schap voor Pluimvee en Eieren, Case C-453/00, [2004] E.C.R. 1-837, 28 (holding that
Article 10 does not require a national court to ignore its internal rules of procedure to
set aside a final judicial decision).
139. See Roquette Frres v. Directeur general de la concurrence, Case C-94/00,
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tendency is certain to continue. The long established duty not
to interfere with the operation of Community law and policy,
discussed above, also involves some assessment of how the rele-
vant national law rule works in practice. The Court has held that
Member States have a general obligation to take measures to sat-
isfy themselves that transactions financed by the European Agri-
cultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund ("EAGGF") are exe-
cuted correctly.140
This kind of case gives rise to a difficulty in Article 234 cases,
because in those cases, the Court's jurisdiction is only to answer
questions of law asked by national courts, and it is not supposed
to apply the law to the facts. The difficulty faced by the national
courts in Article 234 cases is often precisely to apply known legal
principles to the facts. This kind of difficulty in Article 234 cases
is not limited to Article 10 issues. However, the Court is accus-
tomed to trying where possible to provide useful answers to ques-
tions asked by national courts, without exceeding its jurisdic-
tion. Various arrangements have been suggested to make it
easier for national courts to deal with situations of this kind in
Article 234 cases, usually involving specialized judges or courts.
CONCLUSION
Article 10 has repeatedly been used in the first cases in
many important lines of judgments in the Court's case law. It is
the legal basis for some of the most important principles of Com-
munity law. Its importance is constitutional because it deals with
the many interrelationships between Community law and na-
tional law, which in the Community is not a dividing line, as in
[2002] E.C.R. 1-9011; Unibet Ltd. v. Justitiekanslern, Case C-432/05, [2007] E.C.R. I-
2271, 1 42; Commission v. Italy, Case C-129/00, [2003] E.C.R. 1-14637, 1 30; see also
Commission v. Greece, Case C-178/05, slip op., 1 25 (ECJ Apr. 18, 2007) (not yet re-
ported); Commission v. Italy, Case C-135/05, [2007] E.C.R. 1-3475, 1 18; Opinion of
Advocate General Sharpston, Slob v. Productschap Zuivel, Case C-496/04, [2006]
E.C.R. 1-8257, 11 50-51 (opining that Member States may have a duty under Article 10
to adopt measures to supplement EC Regulations if that is necessary to ensure correct
payment of a Community levy).
140. See Greece v. Commission, Case C-157/00, [2003] E.C.R. 1-153, 1 11.
141. See United Pan-Europe Commc'ns Belg. SA v. Etat beige, Case C-250/06, slip
op., 11 18-22 (ECJ Dec. 13, 2007) (not yet reported) ("the Court is unable to provide a
useful answer" because of insufficient information); see also Viacom Outdoor Sri v.
Giotto Immobilier SARL, Case C-134/03, [2005] E.C.R. 1-1167, 1 28-29 ("It is impossi-
ble to establish whether in circumstances such as those of the case ... the questions
relating to the interpretation of those Articles are therefore inadmissible.").
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most federations, but a symbiosis. The case law to which it has
led has developed from its origins and has become generally ac-
cepted, and the role of Article 10 at the start has been largely
forgotten. The Court has used it cautiously, but wisely, in partic-
ular in cases involving new issues, when it was most useful. The
Court stated some basic principles initially, with great foresight,
and has built a valuable body of case law on those principles.
Indeed, the Court has made more and better use of Article 10
than the Commission. But the very general words of the Article
have meant that when legal analysis was needed, it is not Article
10 that is analyzed, but whatever other rule or objective it is
linked with in each case. It is still giving rise to new and impor-
tant conclusions,14 2 and it will certainly lead to new practical re-
sults in Third Pillar cases, on police and judicial cooperation. It
is the Treaty Article with the greatest potential for further devel-
opment.
Article 10 has proved to be a valuable feature of a new and
developing legal system, and a source of useful rules and princi-
ples. This was especially important in the Community, because
the Treaties were not written as a complete constitution, but as a
foundation or framework designed ultimately to be transformed
into a constitution. 43 Article 10 enabled the Court to make ex-
plicit and to develop constitutional principles that had not been
stated in the first Treaties. Article 10, in other words, filled many
of the gaps in the Treaties. Professor Tridimas has written that
"[t] he more interventionist approach of the Court... reached
its apex in the establishment of State liability for damages and
the cognate right to reparation for private parties. Notably, Arti-
cle 10 EC proved instrumental in this development. The Court
has interpreted that provision creatively.' 144
In fact, as this Article shows, the principle of State liability
for damages is only one of several important constitutional prin-
ciples based on Article 10, although it is probably the single prin-
142. See, e.g., Temple Lang, Developments, Issues and New Remedies, supra note 90
(canvassing the variety of conclusions the Court has drawn from the words of Article
10).
143. See JOHN TEMPLE LANG, IS THERE A RATIONAL EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION NOW?
(1998) ; John Temple Lang, The Development of European Community Constitutional Law, 25
INT'L LAW. 455, 455-70 (1991) (analyzing the gradual shift from Member States' powers
to an integrated Community legal system).
144. TAius TRIDIMAs, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAw 421 (2d ed. 2006).
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ciple which did most to make the Community law into an effec-
tive legal system.
Some rules derived from Article 10, although often used,
are no longer changing or developing. The most obvious exam-
ple is the duty to inform the Commission when asked, and the
duty to consult the Commission when problems arise. But other
rules are still developing, most notably the duty to apply Com-
munity law fully and "effectively." A third category of rules are
only beginning to be significant, most obviously the duties aris-
ing from Third Pillar activities. Whenever the Community
adopts new objectives or new laws, Article 10 can give rise to ad-
ditional supplementary rights and duties.
The role of the Advocates General is particularly important
when new issues come before the Court, and a whole range of
new issues will certainly arise as a result of Third Pillar matters
coming under its jurisdiction. When new issues arise, Advocates
General try to set out all of the factors to be taken into account,
and all of the principles and problems involved. Advocates Gen-
eral have referred to Article 10 more often than the Court has
done, and they will certainly continue to do so, in particular
when new issues arise, when Article 10 is most important. It is an
Advocate General or the Commission, rather than the Court,
who might some day attempt to summarize the case law on Arti-
cle 10, if that seemed necessary in the context of an individual
case (although it is hard to imagine a case in which the entire
case law would need to be summarized). It is very much to be
hoped that there will be time, in Third Pillar cases that often
involve personal liberty, for adequate consideration of all the is-
sues involved.
Today, every national court is, within the sphere of its re-
sponsibilities, a Community law court of general jurisdiction,
with the duty and the power to apply all rules of Community law
that may be relevant to the cases coming before it. This is largely
due to Article 10. Judge Pescatore, who first understood the im-
portance and the potential of Article 10, should be well pleased.
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